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INTRODUCTION 
 Biopharmaceutical companies submit vast amounts of clinical data and 
analysis to support approval of their medicines, expecting the information to be 
kept confidential, as has been the practice of regulators around the world for 
decades.  Over the last ten years, however, pressure has been mounting for 
regulators or industry to release this data.  Indeed, European authorities are 
moving swiftly now towards full release over industry objections and despite 
several lawsuits.  Industry generally argues that the material is intellectual 
property—specifically trade secret or confidential commercial information—
and that its release will help a company’s competitors, devaluing the property 
and reducing incentives for medical innovation.  To the limited extent that they 
have addressed the issue, however, legal scholars have generally taken the view 
that no relevant doctrines or bodies of law preclude the release of this material 
and that public policy considerations compel its release.  And the tide is turning, 
with incremental changes in the law in the United States, coercive pressure 
from medical journals to release data as a condition of publication, European 
regulators pressing forward, and industry volunteerism to stave off the most 
aggressive forced disclosure proposals. 
This Article provides a new framework for assessing disclosure of the 
contents of drug applications, by filling several major gaps in the legal 
scholarship.  The key gaps are as follows.  First, scholars in the intellectual 
property field devote very little attention to this sort of information good—both 
the actual content and the context in which it is generated and used.  Application 
of the trade secret label, in particular, has not been subjected to close scrutiny.  
Second, very few have explored the special issues presented by operation in an 
environment where data and analyses are generated and submitted to 
government in order to gain market access—i.e., where the content has both an 
informational value and a regulatory value.  Third, very few have explored the 
implications of operation in a multi-national environment where the decision 
of one regulatory authority to release the material could have profound 
implications on legal outcomes in other jurisdictions. 
My primary thesis is that this content should be understood as property 
rather than trade secret and that the right to exclude includes severable sub-
strands.  The right to prevent disclosure can be severed from the right to prevent 
use, including use by regulators to assist one’s competitors.  This approach 
blunts the impact in the United States of potential disclosure by European 
authorities.  Although this Article focuses on information submitted by 
biopharmaceutical companies for approval to market their medicines, my 
analysis has broader implications.  Participants in many other industry sectors 
submit testing analyses to regulatory authorities around the world to satisfy a 
barrier to entry and with an expectation of confidentiality. 
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Section I of this Article explains the relevant features of the safety and 
effectiveness information in drug applications.  Specifically, this content 
includes raw data (including manipulated and synthesized data) and strategic 
and interpretive writing.  Scholars have not fully identified the potential 
regulatory uses of the former if released, nor have they fully appreciated the 
policy implications of releasing the latter.  Section I also explains the salient 
features of the barrier to market entry, including the difference in scope, cost, 
and risk between innovative applications and follow-on (generic or biosimilar) 
applications, and the fact that essentially the same content is submitted to 
regulators around the world. 
Section II provides a framework for assessing government disclosure of the 
content.  It argues, first, that labeling this content as trade secret is analytically 
problematic.  Both historically and doctrinally trade secret law is private law—
mostly about actions taken in connection with relationships between private 
parties, not a person and the government.  Moreover, the enduring debate in 
trade secret law, whether this law’s origins lie in principles of property or 
principles of unfair competition, arguably collapses in the regulatory context.  
It makes no sense to consider whether the doctrine is property-based or liability-
based, because the government may in fact “take and pay” with respect to 
property.  All roads lead to the property question.  For both reasons, I propose 
that we ignore the trade secret label when considering the disclosure issue.  I 
consider instead whether the contents of marketing applications are property.  
This Section of the Article works primarily from Lockean principles, but 
considers also utilitarian norms. 
After concluding that the contents are property, I turn to characterizing the 
sticks in the bundle of rights.  This is where a deeper understanding of the 
content and its context are most relevant.  This content has both informational 
uses and regulatory uses, to its owner and to potential third parties.  These 
qualitatively different uses for the content lead to a broader right to exclude 
than scholars and courts have previously asserted, including severable rights to 
prevent disclosure and to prevent use.  Thus, disclosure need not deprive the 
owner of the right to disallow direct use—including, for instance, reliance on a 
company’s information by regulators for the benefit of the company’s 
competitors.  This conclusion represents a significant departure from 
conventional wisdom about trade secrets (that disclosure eviscerates the 
property right) and helps to demonstrate why the trade secret label is wrong.  A 
robust reading of the right to exclude, combined with an understanding of the 
full regulatory context, also helps to explain why this content should not be 
viewed as a true public good.  Among other things, released clinical modules 
might be excludable, insofar as a regulator can decline (or be forbidden) to use 
them in support of third party products. 
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Understanding this content as property leads to the conclusion that in the 
United States, takings law applies.  The leading case with respect to data 
submitted for regulatory purposes, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, suggests that 
disclosure is a taking, but it suffers from a serious analytical flaw; Justice 
Blackmun commented that disclosure of the data eviscerated the property 
interest.1  The balance of the Court’s property takings jurisprudence would lead 
to a similar conclusion, although Kaiser Aetna and Mahon remain the most 
compelling precedents, particularly because disclosure to the public at large 
would eliminate the information owner’s ability to profit from the fruits of its 
labor.2  But, because the right to exclude can be understood more broadly than 
Justice Blackmun asserted, disclosure should not be understood to have 
eviscerated all property right in the material.  This could have profound 
implications in the United States, where, for instance, an argument has been 
made that biologic applications filed prior to the enactment of the new 
biosimilars law contain property that cannot be used over the owner’s objection 
to support biosimilars.  The framework presented in this Article should lead to 
the conclusion that disclosure of the content by European authorities has no 
bearing on that use-related takings claim. 
I also argue in Section II that public policy considerations should shape the 
taking and ancillary legal reforms.  The most compelling argument for 
disclosure of the contents of applications is that the information could be used 
by others in ways that would advance the public health (for instance, 
aggregation and meta-analyses) and that industry either cannot do this work or 
lacks the incentive to do it.  The most compelling argument against broad 
disclosure, however, is that the information can be used by competitors to 
support their own commercial programs, immediately harming the application 
holder.  The public policy arguments together point to controlled sharing with 
non-profit researchers to advance general scientific knowledge, including our 
understanding of approved medicines.  In view of the takings issue, however, 
the government should consider incentivizing or rewarding volunteerism.  If 
instead a taking is considered, then compensation must be provided, though it 
could perhaps be accomplished through statutory “in kind” mechanisms.  The 
risk that another regulator will move first, eliminating a takings claim, may also 
call for consideration of reforms that will blunt the impact of disclosure on 
incentives to innovate. 
 
1. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).  
2. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Pennsylvania Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 
393 (1922).   
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I.  BACKGROUND 
This Article provides a legal framework for assessing whether medicine 
regulators should release to the public the safety and effectiveness information 
generated and submitted by private companies in applications for permission to 
market their medicines.  Proponents of release generally characterize release as 
furthering “transparency” with respect to the evidentiary basis for government 
decisions, and they invoke a general policy preference for government “in the 
sunshine”—as embodied, for example, in the U.S. Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA).3  This Article refers instead to “disclosure” and “release” of the 
information in question, in large part because the term “transparency” conveys 
judgment about the appropriate public policy.  The term is also overbroad, 
covering everything from disclosure of internal agency procedures to disclosure 
of government employee addresses. 
Under most modern regulatory schemes, a company wishing to market a 
new medicine must obtain approval to do so, from the government, prior to 
launch.  In the United States, new drugs require new drug applications (NDAs) 
approved under section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA).  Biological products require licenses issued under section 351 of the 
Public Health Service Act (PHSA).  FDA may approve an NDA only if the 
application demonstrates that the drug is safe and effective for use under the 
conditions described in the proposed labeling and, in particular, that there is 
“substantial evidence” of efficacy.4  Substantial evidence means “evidence 
consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical 
investigations . . . .”5  The traditional approach involves three sequential, 
sometimes overlapping, phases of trials in human subjects.6  The third phase 
 
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
4. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).  The original FDCA required only that new drugs be safe and imposed 
a premarket notification requirement on new drug sponsors.  Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 
Pub. L. No. 75-717, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938).  Congress added the effectiveness standard and 
premarket approval requirements in 1962.  Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 
780 (1962).  The 1962 amendments are generally understood as having launched the modern and 
increasingly expensive and lengthy drug research and approval process.  See Anna B. Laakmann, 
Collapsing the Distinction Between Experimentation and Treatment in the Regulation of New Drugs, 
62 ALA. L. REV. 305, 308 (2011) (“The modern U.S. drug regulatory system was born in 1962 with 
passage of the Kefauver-Harris Amendments [to the FDCA].”); Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture 
of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1790 (1996) (“The 1962 
requirements for proof of effectiveness and affirmative FDA approval were destined to increase the 
cost and time required to introduce new drugs.  More extensive clinical testing would be required, and 
the interest on development expenses would rise with the additional time required to convince the 
agency to approve an NDA.”). 
5. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006).  
6. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2013).  Generally speaking, in Phase I trials, a drug is given to a small 
number of test subjects, normally healthy volunteers, in order to determine the metabolism and 
LIETZAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/1/2014  1:25 PM 
2014] A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING CLINICAL DATA 41 
 
provides the substantial evidence of effectiveness.  Section 351 of the PHSA 
requires proof of safety, purity, and potency, and it does not mention 
“substantial evidence.”  Nevertheless, since obtaining jurisdiction over 
biologics in 1972, FDA has interpreted “potent” to require proof of efficacy.7  
The agency also requires biologics applicants to submit substantial evidence of 
effectiveness.8 
An original application for a new molecular entity today typically includes 
the results of dozens of non-clinical studies and clinical trials.9  Raw data from 
clinical trials consist in the purest form of subject-specific case report forms 
(CRFs), on which all information relevant to the clinical trial is recorded—
including demographic information and all relevant measurements (laboratory 
results relevant to outcome measures, for instance).  Demographic information 
and measurements reflect the clinical trial protocol, itself the subject of 
discussion and negotiation with regulators, and through that protocol, the 
company’s business strategy.  Original CRFs are, however, not usually 
submitted to regulatory agencies.  Under FDA regulations, for example, CRFs 
are required only where the subject dropped out or died during the study.  Data 
tabulations are required for the remaining subjects.10  These datasets are 
submitted electronically, conforming to FDA specifications for submission of 
clinical study datasets in electronic format.11  The agency expects that the 
 
pharmacologic actions of the drug in humans, to learn the side effects associated with increasing doses, 
and to gain early evidence of effectiveness.  Phase II investigations involve up to several hundred 
patients with the disease or condition being studied.  They are designed to begin to assess the drug’s 
effectiveness.  They are typically well-controlled and well-monitored.  They are also intended to 
determine short-term side effects and to confirm and refine early data on optimal dosage.  Phase III 
trials collect the pivotal safety and effectiveness data necessary for regulatory approval of the drug.  
They can involve several thousand patients and frequently take place in multiple locations throughout 
the country and abroad.   
7. See, e.g., 46 Fed. Reg. 4634, 4637 (proposed Jan. 16, 1981) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pt.601); 37 Fed. Reg. 16679, 16679 (proposed Aug. 18, 1972) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 273). 
8. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(2)(iii) (2013).  FDA notes that applying the substantial 
evidence standard to biologics presents “unique problems” in some cases.  37 Fed. Reg. at 16679.  
Thus, the requirement for data from adequate and well-controlled investigations (or one such 
investigation with confirmatory evidence) is a default, but not an absolute requirement.  21 C.F.R. § 
601.25(d)(2) (2013).  An applicant may obtain a waiver by showing that: (1) the standard is “not 
reasonably applicable” to the product or “essential to the validity of the investigation” and (2) an 
“alternative method” for substantiating effectiveness is available and adequate.  Id. 
9. According to one report, the average number of clinical studies submitted in an NDA 
between 1977 and 1980 was thirty.  By 1994 and 1995, that figure had more than doubled to sixty-
eight studies.  Barbara Ann Binzak, How Pharmacogenomics Will Impact the Federal Regulation of 
Clinical Trials and the New Drug Approval Process, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 103, 112 n.57 (2003) (“The 
average number of clinical trials per new drug application has increased dramatically, from 30 during 
the period of 1977–1980 to 68 during 1994–1995.”).   
10. 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7453 (Feb. 22, 1985).   
11. FDA, STUDY DATA SPECIFICATIONS (1.5 ver., 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/
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applicant will discuss with the review division the datasets that will be 
provided.  Thus, even the tabulated datasets reflect discussions between the 
applicant and the regulator and could signal the applicant’s business strategy. 
The applicant includes a clinical study report (CSR) for each study.  In this, 
the data is excerpted, organized, manipulated, and presented in tables, graphs, 
and other forms that are helpful to explaining or presenting the trial or some 
aspect of the trial.  This document also presents the company’s conclusions and 
addresses possible follow-ups.  In essence, it explains the study: how it was 
designed and why it was designed that way; how it was performed, including 
changes and surprises along the way (such as protocol deviations and 
amendments and patients dropping out); the results as to every endpoint; and 
statistical analysis and interpretation of the results pursuant to the data analysis 
plan.  A CSR is interpretive and nuanced, and it reflects the company’s 
judgments as to the information the regulator will consider most important and 
which data are key.  The study report inherently conveys information about 
how the company manages its clinical development programs, such as its 
relationship with clinical research organizations and monitors.  There may be 
extensive information about the company’s meetings with and commitments to 
regulators, as well as conclusions based on those meetings.  There may be 
descriptions of the status of ongoing or planned studies and the dates of 
protocols, amendments, and other regulatory submissions. 
The cost to the average company of generating this content is difficult to 
quantify, and there is disagreement regarding what one should measure in the 
first instance and how one should quantify time, lost opportunities, and failed 
molecules.  Estimates vary, but no one doubts that the cost is substantial.12  
Notwithstanding the enormous investment that first entrants must make to bring 
their new medicines to market, second entrants are permitted to piggy-back on 
this investment, so as to climb over the barrier to entry with their copycat 
products without making a similar investment of their own.13  Statutory 
exclusivity periods prevent—for a time—submission or approval of these 
 
downloads/ForIndustry/DataStandards/StudyDataStandards/UCM199599.pdf. 
12. See generally Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, Estimating The Cost Of New Drug 
Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25  HEALTH AFFAIRS 420 (2006).  Adams and Brantner 
review a widely cited figure of $802 million per new drug (in 2000 dollars) for drugs entering human 
clinical trials for the first time between 1989 and 2002 and provide their own estimates, which vary 
from around $500 million to more than $2 billion, depending on the drug and the company.  The $802 
million figure appears in Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of 
Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003). 
13. There are three possibilities: an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA), 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j), a 505(b)(2) application, id. at § 355(b)(2), and a biosimilar biological product application, 42 
U.S.C. § 262(k) (Supp. IV 2010). 
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abbreviated applications.14  These exclusivity periods are known as data 
exclusivity, because when they expire, the second entrants rely indirectly on 
the data in the pioneer application demonstrating that the molecule and product 
were safe and effective.15 
FDA regulations prevent the release of non-public safety and effectiveness 
data and information submitted in an approved NDA unless and until one of six 
events has occurred; and even in those cases, regulations preclude release if 
extraordinary circumstances are shown.16  FDA applies the extraordinary 
circumstances exception where the data and information retain competitive 
value, including overseas, so as a practical matter it does not release the content 
in question.17  The agency’s regulation with respect to biologics license 
applications (BLAs) is drafted differently but achieves the same result.18  The 
current regulations date to the 1970s, but the agency’s non-disclosure policy 
 
14. If no active moiety in a product subject to an NDA has previously been approved, an ANDA 
or 505(b)(2) application may ordinarily not be submitted for five years.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).  
This period is shortened to four years if the follow-on applicant challenges a patent claiming the drug 
or a method of using the drug, but then there is a 30-month stay of approval if the NDA holder or 
patent owner brings timely suit.  Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(ii).  If the pioneer product contains a previously 
approved active moiety, there is no bar on submission of a follow-on application, but FDA may not 
approve the application for three years (assuming the pioneer application included clinical data 
essential to its approval).  See id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii); 21 C.F.R. § 314.108.  A biosimilar application 
may not be submitted until four years after first licensure of a pioneer product, and it may not be 
approved until twelve years after first licensure.  42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7).   
15. See Letter from Janet Woodcock, M.D., Director, CDER, to Katherine M. Sanzo, Esq. and 
Lawrence S. Ganslaw, Esq., Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP; Jeffrey B. Chasnow, Esq., Pfizer; 
Stephan E. Lawton, Esq. and Gillian R. Woollett, Ph.D., BIO; and William R. Rakoczy, Esq., Lord, 
Bissell & Brook LLP, 10 n. 14 (Oct. 14, 2003) (on file with author) (“[R]eliance on an FDA finding 
of safety and effectiveness for an NDA is certainly indirect reliance on the data submitted in the 
original NDA . . . .”); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm. Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(indicating that the ANDA allows the applicant “to piggyback on the safety and efficacy studies 
conducted for the pioneer drug . . . .”).   
16. These events include that the application was found not approvable (and all legal appeals 
exhausted), and that an abbreviated application under the generic drug provisions has been (or could 
be, as a legal matter) approved.  21 C.F.R. § 314.430(f) (2013). 
17. 39 Fed. Reg. 44602, 44613 (Dec. 24, 1974) (clarifying that “extraordinary circumstances” 
include situations in which the information in question retained competitive value); see also 130 Cong. 
Rec. 24977 (Sept. 12, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Under current practice . . . extraordinary 
circumstances are present for example when the information is trade secret or confidential commercial 
or financial information.”); id. at 24978 (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (quoting Commissioner of Food 
and Drugs that this approach “reflects FDA’s current interpretation of the term ‘extraordinary 
circumstances’ as it now appears in the regulations.”). 
18. 21 C.F.R. § 601.51(e) provides that, after FDA approves a BLA, all safety and effectiveness 
data and information in the file “are immediately available for public disclosure unless extraordinary 
circumstances are shown.”  The agency does not, in fact, release the premarket safety and effectiveness 
information, because the information retains competitive value.  See generally FEDERAL DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION, 2004P-1071 C7, LETTER OF ROBERT A. LONG, JR. (July 13, 2005). 
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dates to enactment of the FDCA in 1938.19 
In response to President Obama’s government-wide initiative to promote 
greater transparency in federal agencies, however, FDA convened a 
Transparency Task Force that ultimately suggested convening a panel to 
consider disclosure of safety and effectiveness data in applications.20  The 
report focused on regulatory policy, however, and eschewed legal issues.  After 
Deputy Commissioner Sharfstein left the agency in early 2011, the work of the 
task force was laid aside.  More recently, the agency has solicited comment on 
possibly releasing safety and effectiveness data that have been masked as to 
product identity.21 
The Europeans, however, have taken concrete steps towards release of the 
safety and efficacy information.  In early 2012, the European Medicines 
Agency (EMA) published a guidance document on implementation of the 
Transparency Regulation (the equivalent of our FOIA) with respect to 
marketing authorization applications.22  This guidance states that, following 
product approval, the EMA may release the full non-clinical and clinical data 
package in an application.  This guidance represented the culmination of a 
process that had begun in 2010, when—following an Ombudsman 
recommendation relating to release of data to scientific researchers—the EMA 
 
19. See Drug Listing Act, 1971: Hearing on S. 2167 and H.R. 9936 Before the Comm. on Labor 
& Pub. Welfare, 92d Cong. 46 (1971) (letter submitted by Peter Barton Hutt, Assistant Gen. Counsel, 
Food, Drugs & Envtl. Health Div.) (“Since 1938, the Food and Drug Administration has interpreted 
[various applicable laws] to protect from public disclosure, as confidential, . . . safety and effectiveness 
data, and other similar information submitted to the FDA by the regulated industries.  This has broadly 
been the practice of other Government agencies.”).  From time to time, agency officials have supported 
federal legislation permitting a different approach.  E.g., Business Record Exemption of the Freedom 
of Information Act: Hearings Before the Gov’t Info. & Individual Rights Subcomm. of the H. Comm. 
on Gov’t Operations, 95th Cong. 87 (1977) (statement of Dr. Donald Kennedy, Comm’r, FDA) (“We 
are on record for such a long time and so consistency as regarding safety and efficacy data as being in 
that zone and the industry has come to rely on it.  There is such a long list of precedents that we really 
think we need statutory help with changing that.”); see also Freedom of Information Act: Hearings 
before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 
6 (1977) (statement of Sherwin Gardner, Deputy Comm’r, Food and Drug Admin.) (“Legal constraints 
rather than agency policy choice has largely dictated FDA’s policies and practices with respect to 
release of safety and efficacy data.”). 
20. FDA TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE: DRAFT PROPOSALS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT REGARDING 
DISCLOSURE POLICIES OF THE U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 48–49 (May 2010), available 
at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/Transparency/PublicDisclosure/GlossaryofAcronyms
andAbbreviations/UCM212110.pdf.  
21. 78 Fed. Reg. 33421 (Jun. 4, 2013). 
22. EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY & HEADS OF MEDICINES AGENCIES, HMA/EMA 
GUIDANCE DOCUMENT ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF COMMERCIALLY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 
AND PERSONAL DATA WITHIN THE STRUCTURE OF THE MARKETING AUTHORISATION (MA) 
APPLICATION—RELEASE OF INFORMATION AFTER THE GRANTING OF A MARKETING 
AUTHORISATION (Mar. 2012), available at http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/
Other/2012/03/WC500124536.pdf.   
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changed its own long-standing view that the clinical modules of applications 
were confidential.23  Several lawsuits were brought in early 2012 challenging 
application of the EMA’s policy,24 and interim measures had been granted at 
the time of this Article’s drafting.  In June 2013, consistent with its new 
position, the EMA released a draft policy on proactive release of clinical trial 
data.25  The fate of the EMA policy remains unclear, but the issue is likely to 
end up in the European Commission and Parliament if not preempted by some 
sort of voluntary arrangement. 
Others have joined the discussion, including medical journal editors,26 
various public figures,27 and industry.28  With the exception of the research-
based biopharmaceutical industry, writers in this space almost uniformly 
support release of the safety and effectiveness information in applications.  The 
health policy arguments cited in favor of disclosure, discussed in Section II, 
include the argument that industry may not have the incentive or ability to 
perform some socially beneficial research with the information in question.  
Some who support release also believe that the publicly available information 
is biased in favor of newer and more expensive medicines, driving up utilization 
and healthcare costs.  The academic literature directly on point is scant, 
 
23. DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN CLOSING HIS INQUIRY INTO COMPLAINT 
2560/2007/BEH AGAINST THE EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY, EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN, available 
at http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/decision.faces/en/5459/html.  The Cochrane Institute 
had requested clinical study reports and trial protocols for certain anti-obesity drugs, so that they could 
perform their own analysis.  The Ombudsman rejected the EMA’s view that disclosure to the Cochrane 
Institute would harm the marketing authorization holder’s commercial interests. Id.   
24. Case T 29/13, AbbVie e.a. v. EMA, 2013 O.J. (C 079) 26; Case T 44/13, AbbVie e.a. v. 
EMA, 2013 O.J. (C 079) 53; Case T 73/13, InterMune v. EMA, 2013 O.J. (C 114) 38. 
25. DRAFT POLICY, EMA, PUBLICATION AND ACCESS TO CLINICAL-TRIAL DATA (June 24, 
2013), available at http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2013/06/WC500
144730.pdf.  This document generally takes the position that clinical trial data “cannot be considered” 
confidential commercial information.  Id. at line 50. 
26. See, e.g., Katie Thomas, Medical Journal to Require More Details on Drug Trials, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/01/business/british-medical-
journal-to-require-detailed-clinical-trial-data.html?_r=0 (“The British Medical Journal has announced 
that, beginning in January, it will no longer publish the results of clinical trials unless drug companies 
and researchers agree to provide detailed study data on request.”). 
27. See, e.g., BEN GOLDACRE, BAD PHARMA: HOW DRUG COMPANIES MISLEAD DOCTORS 
AND HARM PATIENTS (2012). 
28. See, e.g., European Fed’n of Pharm. Indus. and Ass’ns [EFPIA], EFPIA Position 
Transparency of Information on Clinical Trials Included in the Proposed EU Database (Article 78 of 
the Proposal for a Regulation on Clinical Trials) (Dec. 10, 2012); Letter from Steve Miller, Executive 
Vice President of Regulatory Affairs, NPAF, to FDA, Div. of Dockets Mgmt. (HFA-305) (July 20, 
2010).  At least in part in response to the threat of disclosure in Europe, industry has recently committed 
to sharing patient-level and study-level data, and protocols, for medicines and uses approved in the 
United States and Europe, with qualified scientific and medical researchers for research purposes.  
Principles for Responsible Clinical Trial Data Sharing, PHRMA, (July 18, 2013), 
http://www.phrma.org/print/1277. 
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although important contributions have been made by Professors Lemmens and 
Telfer (who argue for disclosure primarily from a right to health), Professor 
Reichman (who argues for disclosure partially on the ground that clinical trials 
are a public good), and Professor Cahoy (who argues for tort reform linked to 
disclosure).29  As discussed later, it is possible to shape a narrow approach to 
data release that responds in large part to Professors Lemmens and Telfer.  
Professor Reichman ultimately argues for more profound changes to the way 
we test and approve new medicines, which are beyond the scope of this Article, 
but the “public good” concept may not be fully on point.  Professor Cahoy’s 
points are well taken.  Others whose work might have implications for the 
issue—including scholars writing in the trade secret field—have generally not 
considered this type of information good or the unique context in which it is 
created and shared. 
II.  PLACING DISCLOSURE WITHIN THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
The clinical module of an application is generally considered to be trade 
secret.  Labeling it as trade secret is, however, analytically problematic; the 
label fits awkwardly, trade secret law itself concerns private relationships and 
not relationships with the government, and the doctrinal debate about the nature 
of trade secret law collapses in a regulatory context.  This Article therefore 
proposes to consider the property question from first principles.  Application of 
Lockean labor theory leads to the conclusion that this content is property, and 
this conclusion can also be justified on utilitarian grounds.  Labeling this 
content as property in turn leads to application of the Fifth Amendment.  The 
special context in which this content is generated and functions allows us to 
frame the right to exclude more carefully, however, and leads to an important 
distinction between preventing disclosure and preventing use.  Thus, depending 
on additional factors—some within the control of the disclosing regulator and 
some not—disclosure may or may not obliterate all of the right to exclude.  
This, then, is another reason to reject the trade secret label: it has prompted 
courts and scholars to assume erroneously that disclosure of premarket testing 
information eliminates its status as property.  I agree that public policy 
 
29. See Trudo Lemmens & Candice Telfer, Access to Information and the Right to Health: The 
Human Rights Case for Clinical Trials Transparency, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 63, 66 (2012); Jerome H. 
Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in International Intellectual Property Law: The 
Case for a Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009); Daniel R. Cahoy, 
Medical Product Information Incentives and the Transparency Paradox, 82 IND. L.J. 623, 626–27 
(2007).  Others have written about the issue or subsidiary issues while tackling broader or ancillary 
topics.  See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents, Product Exclusivity, and Information Dissemination: 
How Law Directs Biopharmaceutical Research and Development, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 477 (2003); 
Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International 
Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193 (2005). 
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considerations point towards carefully controlled disclosure to, or sharing with, 
certain third parties for general medical research.  I conclude that policymakers 
should consider measures that would blunt any taking they effect, for instance 
by protecting some of the right to exclude.  But once private property is taken, 
the right to just compensation applies.  In-kind compensation is a possibility, 
but policymakers may want to incentivize volunteerism instead. 
A.  Classification as Trade Secret 
Broadly speaking, trade secret law relates to and in some fashion protects 
ideas, inventions, or knowledge (or other analogous intangibles) that are kept 
mostly secret by a business and are valuable to the business because of that 
secrecy.  The definitions of “trade secret” to which most scholars and courts 
refer can be found in the Restatement (First) of Torts, published by the 
American Law Institute (ALI) in 1939, and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
(UTSA), adopted forty years later.  Both the Restatement and the UTSA 
concern themselves with the liability that attaches when one private party 
commits an act with respect to the trade secret of another private party.  This 
aspect of trade secret law traces its origins to English common law.30 
Section 757 of the Restatement laid out a general principle of liability for 
unauthorized disclosure or use of trade secrets.  Comment b described a “trade 
secret” as “any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is 
used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an 
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it” but explicitly eschewed 
definition.31  The Restatement also described factors to consider, including the 
extent to which the information is known outside the business; the extent to 
which it is known by employees and others involved in the business; measures 
taken to guard the secrecy of the information; the value of the information to 
the company and its competitors; the effort or money expended by the company 
in developing the information; and the ease or difficulty with which the 
information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.  None of these 
factors was meant to be dispositive.  Most courts agree that the Restatement 
concept reaches safety and efficacy information in modern drug applications.32  
 
30. See infra note 57. 
31. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (“An exact definition of a trade 
secret is not possible.”). 
32. See Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(quoting McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Information 
Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L.REV. 837, 961 (1980)) (“Strictly applied, ‘this 
definition would classify virtually all undisclosed health and safety testing data as trade secrets.’”); 
A.L. Labs., Inc. v. Philips Roxane, Inc., 803 F.2d 378, 381 (8th Cir. 1986) (upholding jury decision 
that “study data” in a new animal drug application constituted trade secrets in accordance with the 
Restatement (First) of Torts § 757).  
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Analogously, in the seminal Supreme Court case relating to use and disclosure 
of testing data submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency, Ruckelshaus 
v. Monsanto, the parties stipulated that “much of the information, research, and 
test data” that Monsanto had submitted for approval of its pesticide 
“contain[ed] or relate[d] to trade secrets as defined by the Restatement of 
Torts.”33 
In 1979, the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL), now known as the Uniform Law Commission (ULC), adopted the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).  The ULC serves a very different purpose 
from the American Law Institute.  Rather than restating what they believe to be 
general principles of common law, its members are appointed by state 
governments to draft model legislation in order to achieve “clarity and stability” 
in areas of state law where “uniformity is desirable and practical.”34  The 
drafting of uniform laws is a forward-looking exercise, not a retrospective 
synthesis, although a model law that departs substantially from the common 
law is unlikely to be favored in the state legislatures.  The UTSA, which has 
now been adopted in forty-seven states, D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands, defines a trade secret as “information” that: (1) “derives independent 
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not 
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use” and (2) “is the subject of efforts that 
are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”35  This is 
similar to the Restatement definition, except it does not require that the 
information be used in business, and it adds a requirement that the information 
 
33. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. 986, 1001–02 (1984).  
34. About the ULC, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx
?title=About%20the%20ULC.  Uniformity is desirable with respect to trade secret law for the very 
reason that the multi-national nature of modern medicines law has become problematic: the action of 
one rogue state (for instance, abolishing the concept of “trade secrets” altogether) would have profound 
extraterritorial implications.  In the United States, constitutional principles—including the dormant 
commerce clause—would probably constrain a state in this regard.  In the international context, it may 
ultimately become necessary to bring the issue into treaty negotiations.  Whether and to what extent 
Article 39.3 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement) already prohibits signatory countries from releasing data that can be used by competitors 
in a foreign jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this article but has generated a considerable amount of 
academic scholarship, generally hostile to the view.  See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 29, at 8; see also 
CARLOS MARÍA CORREA, PROTECTION OF DATA SUBMITTED FOR THE REGISTRATION OF 
PHARMACEUTICALS: IMPLEMENTING THE STANDARDS OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT at ix–x, xiii, 14–
16, 47–52, 57–58  (2002).  
35. U.T.S.A. § 1(4) (amended 1985); See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 39 (1995) (“A trade secret is any information that can be used in the operation of a 
business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential 
economic advantage over others.”).   
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be the subject of reasonable efforts to ensure secrecy.36  Neither distinction 
matters here.  The safety and efficacy information at issue is used by 
biopharmaceutical manufacturers (to obtain marketing authorization, for 
instance) and is the subject of extensive efforts to maintain secrecy.37 
The information at issue, therefore, is clearly protected by state trade secret 
law.  Although various federal statutes also employ the phrase, these statutes 
are not analogous to this body of law.  They do not concern themselves with 
the liability that attaches when one private party commits an act with respect to 
the trade secret of another private party.38  Instead, they relate to release by a 
regulator.  These public laws are FOIA, the federal Trade Secrets Act (TSA), 
and the FDCA, discussed briefly below.  As explained below, these laws do not 
independently give meaning to the phrase.  They incorporate the state law 
meaning, and the question for the courts has become whether they incorporate 
the Restatement definition of the phrase or some other definition. 
The most important development in this regard was a 1983 decision of the 
D.C. Circuit relating to Exemption 4 of FOIA.39  This exemption permits 
agencies to decline to disclose “‘trade secrets and commercial or financial 
information obtained from a person [that is] privileged or confidential.”40  FDA 
took the position that undisclosed safety and efficacy information was governed 
by the phrase “trade secret.”  At issue were summaries of adverse reaction and 
complication data, adverse reaction reports, reports of prior experiences, recall 
and product defect information, and information in export approval letters—all 
 
36. Courts applying the state statutes tend to consider the six factors laid out in comment b of 
the Restatement.  See 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01 
(2013).   
37. For instance, there is extensive security at manufacturing facilities and corporate offices to 
prevent unauthorized access to and release of confidential information.  Company employees typically 
receive training on proper procedures for handling confidential information.  Access is limited through 
password protection and other security measures preventing access by employees who do not need the 
information to perform their job functions.  Internal company documents are frequently marked with 
trade secret and/or confidential commercial information designations.  Contractors engaged to support 
applications are required to sign confidentiality agreements.  Documents ultimately submitted to 
regulators are often expressly marked as confidential.  Companies usually have rigorous publication 
review procedures to prevent inadvertent disclosure of trade secrets.  If the data and information are 
subject to discovery during litigation, companies will often seek robust protective orders.  
38. There is one exception.  The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–294, 110 
Stat. 3488 (EEA), criminalizes misappropriation of trade secrets.  The definition of “trade secret” in 
the EEA is not materially different from the definition in the UTSA.  Id. § 1839(3).  A criminal law 
does not function like a statute authorizing trade secret owners to pursue injunctive relief or money 
damages.  Its effectiveness in protecting the interests of industry depends entirely on prosecutorial 
interest.   
39. Pub. Citizen, 704 F.2d at 1290. 
40. Id. 
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submitted to FDA by manufacturers of intraocular lenses.41  The Court of 
Appeals conceded that the Restatement would “classify virtually all 
undisclosed health and safety testing data as trade secrets.”42  It asserted, 
however, a second strand of common law jurisprudence that defined the phrase 
more narrowly, incorporating “a direct relationship between the information at 
issue and the productive process.”43  It further noted that this “restrictive 
approach” was adopted in the only pre-FOIA case interpreting the phrase “trade 
secret” in the federal Trade Secrets Act, “a source to which,” the court assumed, 
“Congress surely would have looked.”44  Thus, the court concluded, “the term 
‘trade secrets’ in Exemption 4 of the FOIA should be defined in its narrower 
common law sense, which incorporates a direct relationship between the 
information at issue and the productive process.”45 
Whether the Public Citizen case controls with respect to safety and 
effectiveness information in new drug and biologics applications is unclear,46 
but the reasoning of the court is vulnerable.  For instance, the invocation of a 
second significant strand of common law jurisprudence is not borne out by the 
literature on trade secret law; most scholars take the view that the Restatement 
faithfully synthesized the common law.47  Also, the primary legislative history 
of FOIA does not indicate that Congress considered the Restatement or that it 
looked to judicial interpretation of the Trade Secrets Act.48  The reasoning of 
 
41. Brief of Appellant, Public Citizen Health Research Grp v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280 (D.C Cir. 
1983) (No. 82-1745), 1982 WL 608916 at *10.   
42. Pub. Citizen, 704 F.2d at 1286. 
43. Id. at 1288. 
44. Id., 704 F.2d. at 1287 (citing United States ex rel. Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United 
States Tariff Comm’n, 6 F.2d 491, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1925), vacated, 274 U.S. 106 (1927)).  
45. Pub. Citizen, 704 F.2d at 1288. 
46. Safety and effectiveness information are still protected under Exemption 4.  The exemption 
separately protects commercial information that is privileged or confidential.  And this concept has 
been held to reach, and is viewed by FDA as reaching, safety and effectiveness information.  See, e.g., 
Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 185 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that safety and 
effectiveness data in investigational new drug applications fall within exemption 4 as confidential 
commercial information).   
47. Some have, however, argued that the narrow Public Citizen definition should be extended 
to other contexts.  See, e.g., Richard S. Fortunato, Note, FDA Disclosure of Safety and Efficacy Data: 
The Scope of Section 301(j), 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1280, 1283 (1984) (arguing that the narrow 
definition from Public Citizen should be adopted for purposes of section 301(j) of the FDCA).  Even 
prior to the decision, some urged the agency to abandon the Restatement definition for FOIA purposes.  
See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety 
Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837, 862–63 (1980). 
48. The legislative history of Public Law 89-487 does not mention the Restatement.  Although 
there was discussion of 18 U.S.C. § 1905 in the hearings, it was mostly government witnesses speaking 
of the statute, and the issue appears to have largely been the relationship between the two schemes.  
See, e.g., Federal Public Records Law, Pt. 1: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations 
& Gov’t Info. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 89th Cong. 30 (1965) (exchange between Benny 
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the Court of Appeals is also undermined by the fact that the federal Trade 
Secrets Act—to which the Court purported to be referring—is interpreted to 
reach testing data.  This criminal statute prohibits unauthorized disclosure of 
trade secrets by federal officials and agencies.49  Courts have generally agreed 
with federal agencies that this provision is coextensive with Exemption 4, 
reaching testing data and analyses, just as the Restatement does.50 
Section 301(j) of the FDCA contains a prohibition similar to that of the 
TSA: it prohibits any person from revealing “information acquired under the 
authority of” the NDA requirement “concerning any method or process which 
as a trade secret is entitled to protection.”51  FDA views this prohibition as 
 
L. Kass, counsel, Foreign Operations & Gov’t Info. Subcomm. and Norbert A. Schlei, Assistant Att’y 
Gen., Dep’t of Justice); Federal Public Records Law, Pt. I: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign 
Operations & Gov’t Info. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 89th Cong. 67 (1965) (exchange 
between Benny L. Kass, counsel, Foreign Operations & Gov’t Info. Subcomm. and Fred Burton Smith, 
Acting Gen. Counsel, Treasury Dep’t).  The case cited by the D.C. Circuit also does not appear in the 
key Senate and House hearings and reports from 1966. 
49. The current statute was adopted in 1948 when Congress consolidated three prior 
nondisclosure statutes: a Commerce Department Statute, a revenue statute, and a Tariff Commission 
Statute.  See H.R. REP. NO. 80-304, at A127-28 (1947).  The latter was the only one of the three to 
prohibit disclosure of trade secrets.  The reference to trade secrets can be traced to the Revenue Act of 
1916, but the legislative history of the time sheds no light on its meaning.  The revenue statute was 
originally passed in 1864 and prohibited disclosure of the “operations, style of work, or apparatus of 
any manufacturer or producer” by revenue officers.  Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, § 38, 13 Stat. 223, 
238 (1864).  The legislative history yields no information beyond what the Supreme Court observed 
in 1979, that “Congress was primarily concerned with unauthorized disclosure of business information 
by feckless or corrupt revenue agents.”  Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 296 (1979). 
50. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ACT, at 354 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_guide09/exemption4
.pdf (“Finally, it should be noted that the Trade Secrets Act . . . prohibits the disclosure of much more 
than simply ‘trade secret’ information and instead prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of all data 
protected by Exemption 4. . . . Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and 
nearly every court that has considered the issue has found the Trade Secrets Act and Exemption 4 to 
be ‘coextensive.’”); 76 Fed. Reg. 21432, 21518 (Apr. 15, 2011) (noting in a final rule promulgated by 
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services that Exemption 4 “is as co-extensive with the Trade 
Secrets Act”); 61 Fed. Reg. 16424, 16425 (proposed April 15, 1996) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. Part 
0) (“Thus, if information may be withheld under Exemption 4, the [Federal Communications 
Commission] is barred from disclosing it by the terms of the Trade Secrets Act unless the disclosure 
is otherwise authorized by law.”).  
51. 21 U.S.C. § 331(j) (2006).  Section 301(j) of the Act does not mention information acquired 
under the authority of the BLA provision, but there is a strong argument it applies. In 1972, when 
authority for reviewing biologics was transferred to FDA, the Commissioner of Food and Drugs noted 
that “all applicable provisions of the [FDCA]” would apply to biologics and that the Division of 
Biologics Standards would have authority to enforce all aspects of the FDCA “except for sections 302 
and 304,” thereby implying that section 301 applied.  37 Fed. Reg. 4004, 4004–05 (Feb. 25, 1972).  
And FDA routinely applies the rest of section 301 to biologics.  Congress codified this approach in 
1997, when it enacted section 351(j) of the PHSA.  This section provides that “[t]he [FDCA] applies 
to a biological product subject to regulation under [PHSA section 351], except that a product for which 
a license has been approved under [section 351(a)] shall not be required to have an approved 
LIETZAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/1/2014  1:25 PM 
52 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 18:1 
 
nondiscretionary52 and has, since its inception, treated section 301(j) as 
reaching safety and effectiveness information in applications.53  No court has 
directly addressed the issue, although the Tenth Circuit has rejected the 
argument that the term “concerning” extends the reach of the provision beyond 
trade secrets (i.e., that information concerning a trade secret method might 
include information that is not, in itself, trade secret).  The case, Anderson v. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,54 involved an attempt to compel FDA to 
 
application under section 505 of such Act.” 42 U.S.C. § 262(j) (2006).  Although BLAs are not 
submitted under section 505, this provision brings them within the protections of section 301(j), which 
is part of the FDCA.  And, indeed, FDA withholds the contents of BLAs from public disclosure.  See 
Krista Hessler Carver, Jeffrey Elikan & Erika Lietzan, An Unofficial Legislative History of the 
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 688 (2010) (“[T]o 
the authors’ knowledge the agency never released the full preclinical and clinical package from a 
BLA.”); Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets and Patents Under the 
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 285, 290 (2011) (“I 
am aware of only one case in which a competitor successfully requested access to a company’s safety 
and effectiveness data” but noting that FDA interpreted its disclosure regulations for BLAs “in a way 
that allowed it to limit the disclosure it was prepared to authorize.”). 
52. See 39 Fed. Reg. 44602, 44619 (Dec. 24, 1974) (“The Commissioner advises . . . that he 
has no discretion to release trade secret information.  All records subject to the trade secrets exemption 
from the Freedom of Information Act are prohibited from public disclosure pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1905 
and 21 U.S.C. 331(j).”); Jerome Stevens Pharms. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(stating that “[t]he parties appear to agree that the disclosure of trade secrets is not a discretionary 
function because federal laws [including 21 U.S.C. § 331(j)] prohibit it”); Anderson v. Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 950 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that section 301(j)’s “prohibition against 
disclosure is absolute”).   
53. 39 Fed. Reg. at 44634 (“The [FDA] Commissioner advises that, since 1938, it has been the 
consistent administrative interpretation that [section 301(j)] can encompass animal and human 
data. . . .”); Business Record Exemption of the Freedom of Information Act: Hearings Before the Gov’t 
Info. & Individual Rights Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 95th Cong. 70 (1977) 
(statement of Dr. Donald Kennedy, Comm’r, FDA) (“We have interpreted, since, 1938, the term 
‘method of process which as a trade secret is entitled to protection’ under section 301(j) of our law as 
encompassing animal and human testing data.”); Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government 
Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1792 n.122 (1996) (noting that “FDA has 
consistently taken the legal position that unpublished safety and effectiveness data submitted as part 
of an NDA are confidential and cannot be released to the public or used to support another 
manufacturer’s NDA.  This position is based on the FDA’s longstanding interpretation of the FD&C 
Act, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and the Trade Secrets Act.” (footnotes omitted) (citing 
Ellen J. Flannery & Peter Barton Hutt, Balancing Competition and Patent Protection in the Drug 
Industry: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 40 FOOD DRUG 
COSM. L.J. 269, 275 (1985)); David M. Dudzinski, Reflections on Historical, Scientific, and Legal 
Issues Relevant to Designing Approval Pathways for Generic Versions of Recombinant Protein-Based 
Therapeutics and Monoclonal Antibodies, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 143, 214 (2005) (“FDA’s long 
standing interpretation is that information submitted to demonstrate safety and effectiveness is 
proprietary, nonpublic information that is protected from disclosure under 21 U.S.C. § 331( j).”); see, 
e.g., United States v. Pastor, 419 F. Supp. 1318, 1342 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (noting that Bureau of Narcotics 
and Dangerous Drugs’ SCID unit did not have access to “raw data regarding drug safety” because 
“FDA considered this information to be trade secret information” under section 331(j) of the Act). 
54. Anderson v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936 (10th Cir. 1990). 
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disclose documents in applications relating to an unapproved liquid silicone 
product.  The manufacturer intervened arguing that the documents fell within 
exemption 4 of FOIA, the TSA, section 301(j), and a confidentiality provision 
specific to devices.55  The district court agreed, but the Tenth Circuit reversed.  
Among other things, it concluded that the term “concerning” in section 301(j) 
plays a structural, but not substantive, role.  The court was guided by the fact 
that FOIA is broadly construed in favor of disclosure and its exemptions 
narrowly construed.  That is, the court let the policies of FOIA guide its 
interpretation of the FDCA.  Under the Tenth Circuit view, although the court 
did not address this point, safety and efficacy data in drug applications probably 
would not be protected under section 301(j).  That does not appear to be FDA’s 
view, however. 
In brief, various relevant public laws use the phrase “trade secret,” and for 
the most part the protection of these laws reaches safety and effectiveness 
information.  But these laws borrow the phrase and concept from the 
substantive common law of trade secrets; they do not comprise a meaningful 
part of the substantive law themselves. 
B.  Analytical Problems with Trade Secret Classification 
While safety and effectiveness information in drug applications is trade 
secret under conventional trade secret law principles (and most public laws 
relating to disclosure or release of testing data and analyses), labeling this 
content as trade secret is analytically problematic.  To begin with, historically 
and doctrinally trade secret law is really mostly private law or, at least, mostly 
about action taken in connection with relationships between private parties—
not between a person and the government.  Further, the enduring debate in trade 
secret law, whether the law’s origins lie in principles of property or principles 
of unfair competition, arguably collapses in the regulatory context.  In this 
context, we care whether this content is trade secret for two reasons: first, 
because applicable public laws like FOIA incorporate the phrase as defined in 
state law (but do not incorporate trade secret law itself); and second, because 
various constitutional principles attach to property and the Supreme Court has 
said that, for purposes of these principles, trade secrets are property.56  But these 
principles attach to property, not to trade secrets.  Getting to property status for 
constitutional purposes through the trade secret label is unnecessary and, as 
shown in Part II(D)(1) may lead to an outcome inconsistent with property status 
 
55. Id. at 940.  After the manufacturer filed its IND for injectable silicone, Congress passed 
amendments to the FDCA giving FDA authority to regulate medical devices.  As a result, injectable 
silicone was reclassified from a drug to a medical device.  Id. at 939.   
56. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003–04. 
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in the first instance. 
1.  Trade Secret Law is Not Directly on Point 
Trade secret law in the United States is usually traced through an 1868 
decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, Peabody v. Norfolk.57  Both 
before and after Peabody, trade secret law in the United States has been a matter 
of common law.  The doctrine that evolved in the states was fairly uniform, 
however, at least in part because of its origin in English common law58 and 
probably also because the basic principles (as articulated in Peabody for 
instance) are necessary for the orderly working of an industrial society with 
increasingly interstate commerce.59 
Peabody concerned confidential information shared by Joseph Peabody 
with John Norfolk in connection with Norfolk’s employment as an engineer in 
Peabody’s jute (gunny cloth) factory.  The information related to the 
construction and operation of machinery in the factory.  Peabody alleged in his 
initial prayer for injunction that Norfolk had left his employment, made 
arrangements with others to build a competing factory, and shared with them 
information about Peabody’s manufacturing process and machinery, including 
drawings.  After Norfolk was enjoined, Peabody identified a recipient of the 
secrets, James Cook, who was pretending to build competing machinery in his 
own name, using information, models, and drawings obtained from Norfolk, 
with full notice of the relationship between Peabody and Norfolk.  A second 
injunction, against Cook, was also granted.60 
The court began by asserting the policy of the law “for the advantage of the 
public, to encourage and protect invention and commercial enterprise.”61  
Before turning to the facts at hand, the court devoted six paragraphs to laying 
out a theory for protection of business secrets grounded at least in part in the 
language of private property.  “If a man establishes a business and makes it 
valuable by his skill and attention,” the court observed, “the good will of that 
business is recognized by the law as property.”62  Moreover, “[i]f he invents or 
 
57. 98 Mass. 452 (1868); see, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine 
in Search of Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 252 (1998); James W. Hill, Trade Secrets, Unjust 
Enrichment, and the Classification of Obligations, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, ¶ 12 (1999); Michael Risch, 
Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 5 (2007) (citing Peabody, 95 
Mass. 425 at 458).   
58. E.g., Bone, supra note 57, at 252 & n.55 (discussing various English cases from the 1800s). 
59. See, e.g., U.T.S.A. § 8 (amended 1985) (“This [Act] shall be applied and construed to 
effectuate its general purposes to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this [Act] among 
states enacting it.”). 
60. Peabody, 98 Mass. at 461. 
61. Id. at 457. 
62. Id. 
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discovers, and keeps secret, a process of manufacture, whether a proper subject 
for a patent or not, . . . he has a property in it.”63  Ultimately, “it is settled that 
a secret art is a legal subject of property.”64  Thus, “a bond for a conveyance of 
the exclusive right to it is not open to the objection of being in restraint of trade, 
but may be enforced by action at law, and requires the obligor not to divulge 
the secret to any other person.”65 
Although Peabody does not represent the birth of trade secret law in this 
country, the decision is seminal because it collected and synthesized earlier 
cases and laid out a coherent theory for the doctrine.  The court left an important 
gap, however: if a man “invents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of 
manufacture, whether a proper subject for patent or not,” although he has a 
property interest, “he has not indeed an exclusive right to it against the public, 
or against those who in good faith acquire knowledge of it.”  This sentence 
signals the notion that information held trade secret can be “reverse 
engineered”—independently discovered by a third party—with impunity.  And 
it suggests the early doctrine did not consider public law issues.  Indeed, as 
explained in the paragraphs that follow, trade secret law still mostly does not 
account for the realities of the modern regulatory state.  The doctrine emerged 
within the context of, and academic and judicial writing continues to focus on, 
private relationships.66 
Section 757 of the Restatement, which synthesized the common law as of 
1939, set out a general principle of liability for unauthorized use or disclosure 
of trade secrets.  Liability attached if: 
(a) [the defendant] discovered the trade secret by improper means . . . 
(b) his disclosure or use constitute[d] a breach of confidence . . . (c) he 
learned the secret from a third party with notice of the fact that it was 
secret and that the third person discovered it by improper means or that 
the third person’s disclosure . . . [was] . . . a breach of his duty . . . or 
(d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was secret and 
its disclosure was made to him by mistake.67 
The model law created in the 1970s took a similar approach: the goal was 
to provide remedies for misappropriation, defined broadly to mean both: (1) 
acquisition through improper means, and (2) use or disclosure without consent 
 
63. Id. at 458. 
64. Id. at 459–60. 
65. Id. at 460 (citation omitted). 
66. One notable exception in the literature is chapter 12 of Milgrim’s treatise on trade secrets.  
See MILGRIM, supra note 36, at ch. 12. 
67. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939).   
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and with some degree of culpability (e.g., knowledge that the secret was 
acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty of confidentiality).68 
The Restatement and UTSA theories comprise the basic essence of trade 
secret law.  The theories can, in principle, work in the regulatory setting.  That 
is, an injunction would appear warranted where a regulator discloses trade 
secrets without consent and with knowledge that the trade secrets were acquired 
with the expectation that they would be kept confidential.  State statutes 
adopting the UTSA are not, however, typically invoked by plaintiffs in such a 
manner,69 and there is no true federal equivalent.  The federal statute 
criminalizing misappropriation of trade secrets does not provide relief against 
the government.70 
Further, basic assumptions of trade secret law do not apply to this content.  
Most notably, the classic hallmarks of reverse engineering and independent 
discovery do not apply.  While it may be true that trade secrets are not good 
against the rest of the world because others may independently discover them,71 
the point is almost nonsensical with respect to safety and effectiveness 
information.  If a third person were to stumble independently into the secret for 
Coca Cola, for instance, the rule is that person would be free to make and sell 
its product.  If the formula were instead patented, it would be widely known, 
but federal law would, for a time, preclude its use.  Thus, an inventor faces a 
choice between patent law (which blocks competition even in the event of 
independent discovery but ends after twenty years) and trade secret status 
(which provides no protection against independent discovery but is infinite in 
duration).  It is, however, logically impossible for another person to 
independently discover the results of a clinical trial, which was performed some 
years earlier, with particular lots of an investigational product, and involved 
administration to particular individuals on particular days and measurement of 
specific parameters from those individuals.  It is also logically impossible to 
independently generate the sponsor’s judgments about how to describe the 
product and results, in view of its own business strategy and after particular 
 
68. See U.T.S.A. § 1(2) (amended 1985). 
69. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act contemplates such a cause of action.  A “person” liable for 
misappropriation of trade secrets is defined to include a “governmental subdivision or agency.”  
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985).  Injunctions against government officials are 
available under other state statutes, however, and these laws seems to be more commonly invoked.  
See, e.g., Lane v. Commonwealth, 517 N.E.2d 1281, 1282 (Mass. 1988) (holding that the plaintiff 
would be entitled to an injunction against state officials and employees under the Massachusetts Tort 
Claims Act if she could establish that the defendants were wrongfully using her trade secrets in the 
form of a computer software package used to compile municipal financial data). 
70. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–294, § 1833, 110 Stat. 3488.   
71. E.g., Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse 
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1582–83 (2002).   
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conversations with particular persons at the agency.  The possibility of 
independent discovery makes sense with respect to the formula for Coca Cola 
or the design of an aircraft.  But the possibility of independent discovery, which 
features prominently in trade secret scholarship, and the classic choice between 
patent protection and trade secret status, makes no sense for the content at issue 
here.  And the possibility that one might be able to reverse engineer the product 
is irrelevant.  The information at issue here is not “how to make the product”—
it is instead the data, information, and analyses generated and prepared to 
overcome the regulatory barrier to market entry. 
2.  The Doctrinal Debate Collapses 
A great deal of scholarship has attempted to make sense of trade secret law, 
categorizing and critiquing its various justifications and objectives and, in at 
least one instance, also suggesting that at bottom there is no such thing as a 
coherent and separate body of trade secret law.72  The story this scholarship 
tells of the history and black letter content of state trade secret law is consistent.  
What varies meaningfully, however, is whether and how scholars see an 
underlying doctrine and how they describe and assess its justifications.  In 
particular, the scholarship is dominated by an enduring doctrinal debate: 
whether trade secret law is primarily a law of liability (relationship) principles 
or a law of property (exclusivity and ownership). 
The argument that trade secret law in the United States is primarily a law 
about the liability that attaches when parties in relationships violate social 
norms rely heavily on a key sentence in Justice Holmes’s 1917 decision, E.I. 
du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland.73  Masland concerned secrets 
learned by Walter Masland while employed by DuPont.  Masland was 
establishing a business that would manufacture artificial leather, and some of 
the secrets at issue were relevant, although Masland himself asserted that much 
of the information was in fact “well known to the trade.”  DuPont nevertheless 
sought an injunction to prevent Masland from using or disclosing those secrets.  
As part of the litigation, to defend against the injunction, Masland proposed to 
 
72. See, e.g., Risch, supra note 57 at 26–37 (discussing economic, philosophical, and populist 
justifications for trade secret protection); Hill, supra note 57 at ¶ 124 (identifying economic and moral 
justifications for trade secret law; exploring property, contract, quasi-contract, and tort aspects of trade 
secret law; and ultimately concluding that trade secret law is a “fusion” of tort and unjust enrichment 
principles); Bone, supra note 57 (examining and rejecting arguments from efficiency, arguments from 
rights and fairness, and arguments from norms about unfair competition); Jonathan R.K. Stroud, The 
Tragedy of the Commons: Toward a Hybrid Property/Relationship Understanding of Trade Secrets, 
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2216659 
(arguing that a hybrid approach will allow for prospective protection of trade secrets that have been 
disclosed). 
73. 244 U.S. 100 (1917). 
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disclose the secrets in question to experts and witnesses.  At issue before the 
Supreme Court was the appropriateness of an injunction against disclosing the 
trade secrets to experts, consultants, and defense counsel for purposes of 
defense.  The case was put to the Court as a conflict between the right of 
property and the right to make a full defense.  In a terse three-paragraph 
opinion, Justice Holmes brushed that proposed conflict aside.  Rather than 
attempting to resolve a fundamental conflict of first principles, he picked a 
narrower resolution: “Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not[,] 
the defendant knows the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence 
he accepted.  The property may be denied, but the confidence cannot be.”  Thus, 
“the starting point for the present matter is not property or due process of law, 
but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs, or one 
of them . . . If there is any disadvantage in the fact that he knew the plaintiffs’ 
secrets, he must take the burden with the good.”74 
Those who favor the view that trade secret law is primarily a law of unfair 
competition suggest that Justice Holmes effectively rejected the argument that 
trade secrets were property.  They note also that the drafters of the first 
Restatement in 1939 took pains to distance trade secret liability principles from 
property doctrine.  Indeed, comment a noted that “[t]he suggestion that one has 
a right to exclude others from the use of his trade secret because he has a right 
of property in the idea has been frequently advanced and rejected.”75  According 
to the drafters, “[t]he theory that has prevailed is that the protection is afforded 
only by a general duty of good faith and that the liability rests upon breach of 
this duty.”76  In other words, they asserted, the essence of liability lies in breach 
of contract, abuse of confidence, or improprieties in obtaining the secret.77  The 
ALI later moved trade secrets entirely to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition, again reflecting the supposedly predominant view that trade 
secret law is primarily about enforcing behavioral norms in business 
relationships.78  While the language of natural property rights can be found in 
early trade/business secret jurisprudence, this approach did not survive the 
emergence of legal realism in the early twentieth century.79  Thus, this view 
holds, trade secrets are not really property at all.  Rather, trade secrets are 
 
74. Id. at 102 
75. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39–45 (1995). 
79. For instance, Professor Bone states that legal realism “stripped away” the property 
foundation (and therefore the “justifying theory”) for trade secret law.  Bone, supra note 57, at 251, 
260 (“Why give legal protection to secret information?  As I discuss later, this question had a relatively 
clear answer in the late nineteenth century, but the answer lost its power to persuade with the 
ascendancy of legal realism in the 1920s and 1930s.”). Id. at 251. 
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merely the subject of undertakings within the context of a relationship between 
two parties.80  Some also make policy and normative arguments against the 
treatment of trade secrets as property, suggesting that this leads to 
overprotection of the assets in question.81 
This Article subscribes to the position that trade secret law is instead 
primarily about protection of property.  Under this view, Masland must be 
understood as an exercise in judicial restraint, a refusal to resolve the doctrinal 
conflict presented by the petitioner.  Justice Holmes meant only that the 
property question—the tension between first principles—did not need to be 
resolved in order for the case to be decided.82  Further, it has been established 
that despite the prompting of the ALI drafters, the cases that followed did not 
accept the distancing from property concepts.83  It is possible the ALI reporters 
were reading the cases selectively or attempting to shape the law prospectively 
in the first Restatement.  To be sure, the ALI continued on its own path, 
omitting the chapter on trade secrets in the second Restatement of Torts and 
ultimately placing them in the third Restatement of Competition.  But of these 
Restatements, it is the initial 1939 Restatement of Torts that remains influential 
in the courts and agencies with respect to trade secrets, comment a—which 
most aggressively distanced trade secrets from property—generally forgotten.84  
 
80. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 
1154 n.148 (2000) (arguing in part from the dictum in Masland); Pamela Samuelson, Information as 
Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 
38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365 (1989). 
81. Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon, or Intellectual Property Olympian? A Normative 
Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 84 (1999); Samuelson, 
Information as Property, supra note 80, at 399.  As to over-protection, Professor Risch responds 
persuasively that real property rights are themselves neither infinite nor impermeable.  They are subject 
to various limitations, including land use regulations and easements.  Risch, supra note 57, at 24.  This 
is, indeed, the point of subsection 0 of this article, which suggests that although this content is property, 
it can be taken, subject to Fifth Amendment compensation requirements. 
82. See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, ET AL., UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
199–200 (2d ed. 2011).   
83. See, e.g., Id. at 206–207 (“The Restatement’s authors also sought to purge the property 
principle from trade secret laws[.] . . . To the contrary, the theory that has prevailed in the post-
Restatement era is that a property right in a trade secret, although terminated by public disclosure, will 
be upheld against misappropriators and protected in a variety of contexts.”).  But see Samuelson, 
Information as Property, supra note 80, at 365 (“Trade secret law has long afforded remedies to the 
possessor of secret information against those who use improper means to obtain the secret and those 
who disclose it in violation of confidential relationships, but the law has, in general, resisted 
characterizing the secret itself as property.”). 
84. See generally MILGRIM, supra note 36, at § 1.01 (noting “universal reliance on § 757 of the 
1939 Restatement of Torts” and the fact that the Restatement (Third) of Competition “has not been 
relied upon by many courts”).  There are twenty-four published federal court cases and ten published 
state court cases citing comment a.  Many focus on the relationship between the parties, and some cite 
Masland, but they constitute a minority of cases. 
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Professor Epstein also points to a fundamental theoretical problem with the 
view that trade secret protection derives from a relationship between two 
parties: this would imply a lack of protection where the information is not 
shared with anyone, which is illogical.85 
The debate endures, with some questioning why it even matters,86 and 
others arguing that the early cases and writings evidence strains from many 
strands of thought, including contracts, torts, and ethics.87  Professor Milgrim 
marries the two strands by arguing that the law of unfair competition applies 
only because there is some sort of property at issue in the first instance and that 
a property right is therefore inherently a relational right.88  The debate is not 
only about where the origins of trade secret law lie but also, of course, what the 
appropriate approach should be going forward.  This is an essentially positivist 
debate to be having in the first instance.  If assets generated through intellectual 
labor are “property” in any sort of natural law sense—which most writers today 
seem to discount—the debate would be beside the point.  It is probably also 
true that in the private law setting it is “unnecessary to call trade secrets 
‘property’ in order to enforce confidences and penalize those who use improper 
means to obtain . . .  [those] secrets.”89 
But the question whether trade secrets are property in any meaningful sense 
or simply an interest or posture that is protected through liability rules and 
behavioral norms collapses in a regulatory setting.  The content in question is 
provided to the government in exchange for a license to do business.  The 
relationship between the parties to this transaction is not one of private entities 
on equal footing.  Further, in a regulatory state, concepts like business ethics, 
commercial morality, and even misappropriation are replaced functionally by 
due process and other Fifth Amendment principles.  Here, property status is 
dispositive.  Moreover, even the distinction between the doctrines collapses.  It 
makes no sense to consider whether the doctrine is property law (under which 
 
85. Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets under the Takings 
Clause, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 60 (2004). 
86. E.g., Kenneth Einar Himma, Toward a Lockean Moral Justification of Legal Protection of 
Intellectual Property, SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 2–3) (on file with author) 
(arguing that the debate over whether content is property is a “distraction,” because “the important 
issue is whether content creators have a moral interest in the content they create that justifies legal 
protection that allows them to exclude others.”). 
87. See, e.g., MILGRIM, supra note 36, at § 1.01.  One could place Professor Bone in this group, 
because he takes the view that trade secret law is “mainly just a collection of other legal norms.”  Bone, 
supra note 57, at 243. 
88. 1A ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 2.01 at 2–9 
(2013). 
89. Samuelson, Information as Property, supra note 80, at 375.  Whether state trade secret 
statutes ultimately enforce commercial ethics or ownership principles, or both, they can be applied by 
the courts without a view taken on the underlying doctrinal point.  See, e.g., id. at 375. 
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reallocation of assets occurs through voluntary negotiation) or liability law 
(under which reallocation of assets leads through business norms to a payment 
requirement), because the government may in fact lawfully “take and pay” with 
respect to property.  Thus, all roads lead to the property question. 
To be sure, in the regulatory setting, the trade secret label matters because 
various applicable public laws use the phrase.  The Federal Trade Secrets Act, 
Exemption 4 of FOIA, and section 301(j) of the FDCA use the phrase.  But, as 
noted, these are not part of the substantive law of trade secrets; they simply 
incorporate the concept by reference.  In the core law that limits the actions of 
the government with respect to the governed—the Constitution, and here the 
Fifth Amendment—what really matters in this context is whether there is 
“property” at issue.  This Article therefore proposes laying aside the trade secret 
question and working from first principles on the question whether the content 
at issue is property. 
C.  The Property Question 
1.  Defining the Content as Property 
In chapter 5 of his Second Treatise of Government, published in 1690, John 
Locke posited that when one creates something of value through one’s labor, 
one owns the end result of that labor.90  There is a fundamental difference of 
opinion as to whether property arises automatically by operation of natural law, 
in the sense that Locke envisioned, or is instead a creation of law, dependent 
on the judgment of society that a particular right to use or exclude should be 
protected.  Locke’s formulation was enormously influential in early American 
political thought,91 however, and, despite the influence of legal realism, 
continues to echo through U.S. property doctrine.92  Moreover, the Peabody 
 
90. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, ch. 5 (C. B. Macpherson ed., 
Hackett Publishing Co. 1980) (1690).  See, e.g., id. at § 27 (“Though the earth, and all inferior 
creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has 
any right to but himself.  The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly 
his.  Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed 
his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.”); id. at 
§ 32 (“As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is 
his property.  He by his labour does, as it were, inclose it from the common.”). 
91. See, e.g., Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary 
America, 19 J.L. & ECON. 467, 474 (1976) (indicating Jefferson also adopted the Lockean view that a 
man’s “property was whatever he produced by dint of his personal labor . . . .”); 6 JAMES MADISON, 
Property, in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 101 (Gailard Hunt ed., 1906) (writing after the Fifth 
Amendment had been adopted that “[i]n its larger and juster meaning, [the term property] embraces 
every thing to which a man may attach a value and have a right . . . .”). 
92. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus  467 U.S. 1002–03 (“This general perception of trade secrets as 
property is consonant with a notion of ‘property’ that extends beyond land and tangible goods and 
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case itself echoed Locke.93 
Locke was writing about a resource open for development—non-scarce 
land in the new world.94  In the most relevant respects, pharmaceutical research 
and development is analogous.95  Properly understood, this research space is 
not just non-scarce, it is infinite.  A second entrant can build (or attempt to 
build) the same molecule, or a variation of the molecule, and imagine its own 
research and development program, perhaps to prove the same propositions, 
perhaps to prove new propositions, can design trials, recruit entirely new 
subjects in another part of the country, generate new data, package those data, 
and seek its own approval.  A third entrant can build an entirely different 
molecule.  No two research and development programs are identical—if for no 
other reason, because it is a physical impossibility for trials and results to be 
identical; they are the particular product of their time and place.  Research and 
development programs, and the resulting data and analyses, are inherently 
infinite in permutations and in number.  This asset is non-scarce in the sense 
that a property right would not, in any fashion, block another person who 
independently develops analogous information (the neighboring plot).  
Approaching the question from the natural rights labor-oriented position of 
Locke leads to the conclusion that the content of these applications is 
property.96 
A utilitarian approach leads to the same conclusion.  Biopharmaceutical 
 
includes the products of an individual’s ‘labour and invention.’”) (citing Locke as well as Blackstone’s 
Commentaries); Alaska Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., 834 P.2d 134, 137–39 
(Alaska 1991) (finding that company’s results from oil well drillings were property for state and federal 
constitutional purposes and citing Locke).   
93. Peabody, 98 Mass. at 457 (“If a man establishes a business and makes it valuable by his 
skill and attention, the good will of that business is recognized by the law as property.”). 
94. See LOCKE, supra note 90, at § 33 (“Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by 
improving it, any prejudice to any other man, since there was still enough, and as good left; and more 
than the yet unprovided could use.  So that, in effect, there was never the less left for others because 
of his enclosure for himself: for he that leaves as much as another can make use of, does as good as 
take nothing at all.”); id. at § 36 (“The measure of property nature has well set by the extent of man’s 
labour and the conveniences of life: no man’s labour could subdue, or appropriate all; nor could his 
enjoyment consume more than a small part; so that it was impossible for any man, this way, to intrench 
upon the right of another, or acquire to himself a property, to the prejudice of his neighbour, who would 
still have room for as good, and as large a possession (after the other had taken out his) as before it 
was appropriated.”). 
95. See also id. at § 44 (“From all which it is evident, that though the things of nature are given 
in common, yet man, by being master of himself, and proprietor of his own person, and the actions or 
labour of it, had still in himself the great foundation of property; and that, which made up the great 
part of what he applied to the support or comfort of his being, when invention and arts had improved 
the conveniences of life, was perfectly his own, and did not belong in common to others.”). 
96. See also Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and 
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1549–64 (1993) 
(applying Lockean principles to intellectual property).   
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research and development generates the safety and efficacy information without 
which the actual medicine could not be provided to patients.  So long as the 
regulatory state erects a barrier to entry for medicines, which requires the 
creation of this intellectual content, society will benefit from the labor in 
question.  Property status, with its attendant right to exclude, allows the content 
creator to benefit from his labor and provides the incentive for him to perform 
it, for society’s benefit.  Indeed, Lockean theory itself has a utilitarian strain, 
because society as a whole benefits from the labor that is put into creation of 
the value in question.97  A time-shifting variation of the “tragedy of the 
commons” may also play out in the absence of property status: if every 
competitor could immediately access, learn from, and use the safety and 
effectiveness information generated by an innovator, many competitors could 
profit, and perhaps through lower prices patients and government programs 
(and thereby taxpayers) would benefit.  But, appropriation of that property 
immediately for the benefit of all may lead to less enthusiasm for innovative 
research in the future—essentially killing the “golden goose” to the detriment 
of future patients.98  That said, the utilitarian argument for property status, 
standing alone, invites abrogation of the right once adequate incentive has been 
provided.99  In my view, a positivist approach (content is property only because 
and if the law says it is property) abandons any pretense to moral grounding for 
basic property doctrine.  Taken to an extreme, this approach to defining 
property results in anarchy.  If intellectual content can simply be reclassified as 
not-property in the first instance, then so too can real property. 
Considering the property question ab initio shows that commenters are off 
the mark when they suggest that patent protection for the product renders 
 
97. LOCKE, supra note 90, at § 37 (“To which let me add, that he who appropriates land to 
himself by his labour, does not lessen, but increase the common stock of mankind: for the provisions 
serving to the support of human life, produced by one acre of inclosed and cultivated land, are (to 
speak much within compass) ten times more than those which are yielded by an acre of land of an 
equal richness lying waste in common.”). 
98. A “tragedy of the commons” occurs where no one has the right to exclude, and the optimal 
resource use for each individual (which ensues) leads to despoliation of the resource, to the detriment 
of all.  See, e.g., Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244–45 (1968). 
99. For instance, some stakeholders justified twelve-year regulatory exclusivity for biological 
products by reference to Professor Grabowski’s work finding that the break-even point for most 
biological molecules is between 12.9 and 16.2 years after approval.  See BIO, A Follow-On Biologics 
Regime Without Strong Data Exclusivity Will Stifle the Development of New Medicines 4 (Sept. 26, 
2007), available at http://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/FOBSData_exclusivity_20070926_0.pdf 
(cited in Krista Hessler Carver, Jeffrey Elikan, & Erika Lietzan, An Unofficial Legislative History of 
the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 727 (2010));  
Henry Grabowski, Data Exclusivity for New Biological Entities 21, 26 (Duke University Dep’t. of 
Econ., Working Paper, 2007).  Some of the debate over the appropriate length of the exclusivity period 
then shifted to whether this empirical assertion was correct, see id. at 735–37, with stakeholders 
unintentionally conceding the shift from a natural rights perspective to a positivist perspective.   
LIETZAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/1/2014  1:25 PM 
64 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 18:1 
 
protection of this content superfluous.100  To be sure, they are also off the mark 
analytically.  Anything that might be patented (the compound, the formulation, 
a manufacturing process, etc.) is different from the content at issue here (both 
data and writing that reflect creativity, judgment, strategy, and labor and that 
are intended to overcome a regulatory barrier to market entry).101  Although 
some might argue that generating the data is simply a cost of doing business in 
the regulatory state and that a patent should provide sufficient incentive, there 
are both policy and doctrinal responses.102  Some products receive no patent, 
and for these, protection of the content in the application (through both non-
reliance and non-disclosure rules) is all that stands between abandonment of 
the molecule and a new medicine for patients.103  And if the state can use its 
commerce power to erect regulatory barriers that functionally require, as a 
condition of market access, the creation of (intellectual) property that is then 
immediately confiscated for the public good, there is no principled way to draw 
a line and preclude confiscation of patents or, even, real property as a condition 
of market access.104  The theoretical point is therefore important.  While patents 
are a creation of positive law, the generation of ideas and data about an item 
that may or may not be patented is labor that under Lockean principles results 
in a property right of its own accord. 
Concluding that the content at issue is property leads to the question what 
rights comprise the bundle of property rights.  The straightforward approach is 
to work from first principles in property law, rather than to create a special list 
 
100. In his work opposing data protection, for instance, Professor Reichman has noted that 
would-be competitors generally cannot market a generic drug until patents expire.  E.g., Reichman, 
supra note 29, at 7.  Emily Marden inverts the argument, suggesting that data exclusivity can render 
patents unnecessary.  See Emily Marden, Open Source Drug Development: A Path to More Accessible 
Drugs and Diagnostics?, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 217, 244–45 (2010). 
101. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974) (“Each has its particular 
role to play . . . .  Trade secret law encourages the development and exploitation of those items of lesser 
or different invention than might be accorded protection under the patent laws, but which items still 
have an important part to play in the technological and scientific advancement of the Nation.”); see 
also CHISUM, supra note 82, at 3 (“To the extent there is a property interest in intellectual creations, it 
is an intangible interest that must be carefully distinguished from property in tangible objects that either 
make the creation possible or that the creation makes possible.”). 
102. There is also a practical response.  Even where the product is protected by patent, the 
safety and effectiveness information in the application could be used by a competitor to partially 
support approval of a different and non-infringing product.  
103. Drugs that have reached the market with no listed patents, but only regulatory exclusivity, 
include: Mefloquine HCl (mefloquine hydrochloride), Clozaril (clozapine), Hexalen (altretamine), 
Leustatin (cladribine), Trasylol (aprotinin bovine), Sclerosol (talc), and Ellence (epirubicin 
hydrochloride).  All were important enough to earn priority review at FDA.  By the author’s count, 
over 100 NDAs approved since 1984 held exclusivity but had no listed patents.  Congress has 
considered enacting special incentives for medicines that are unlikely to be patentable and might not 
otherwise be developed.  E.g., MODDERN Cures Act of 2011, H.R. 3497, 112th Cong. § 201 (2011). 
104. Epstein, supra note 51, at 307.   
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that attaches to intellectual property or trade secrets per se.105  When one owns 
property, one has the right to use the property (or not), the right to permit (or 
deny) others the right to use the property (often called the right to exclude, 
though it is also a right to include, as selectively as one wishes), and the right 
to dispose of the property (or not).106  There is no particular reason why an asset 
has to be tangible for these principles to apply, and the principles readily apply 
to the assets at issue here.107 
To begin with, one has the right to use or not use the property in question.  
A biopharmaceutical manufacturer that generates safety and effectiveness data 
and information about a new molecule has the right to use this asset as it sees 
fit.  This includes using the information to support approval of the product in 
the United States, in Europe, and around the world.  It includes not seeking 
approval, for instance, in countries with regulators that are prone to releasing 
confidential information or in countries where the company judges market 
opportunities insufficient.  The company may use the data and analysis to 
generate new ideas.  And it could use the content as a template for subsequent 
research on similar molecules or second generation versions of the same 
molecule.  It could even lay the content entirely aside, having made a decision 
not to seek approval of the product. 
One also has the right to permit, or deny, others to use the property in 
question—the right to exclude.  A biopharmaceutical manufacturer that 
generates a clinical module thus has the right to permit, or deny, others to use 
the property.  This could include permitting a second applicant to refer to the 
information in its own regulatory filings, without seeing the information, i.e., 
 
105. Professor Risch describes a complex list of rights and duties attendant to trade secrets, 
deriving from the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Professor Milgrim’s treatise, and the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Monsanto.  See Risch, supra note 57, at 24–25 (“The right to keep certain information 
secret and still obtain legal protection . . . [i]ncluding the right to exclude others from disclosing [and] 
the right to exclude others . . . from using;” “[t]he duty to attempt to keep information secret;” “[t]he 
right to use certain information as one wishes and still receive protection even if others have the same 
information;” “[t]he right to not use certain information if one wishes and still obtain legal protection;” 
“[t]he right to recover damages for harm caused by illicit use or disclosure;” “[t]he right to recover the 
benefits from others for the illicit use or disclosure;” “[t]he right to transfer, devise, or otherwise make 
exclusive grants;” and “[t]he right to compensation for a government taking of certain [property].”).  
Although Professor Risch suggests that these rights and duties are different from those associated with 
other types of property, they may ultimately boil down to the three basic principles discussed in this 
article.   
106. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003 (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 
323 U.S. 373, 377–378 (1945)) (“the right to possess, use and dispose”); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. 
Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Ruckelshaus and finding the trade secret property elements 
to be the ability to use, disclose, and transfer). 
107. Even those who argue that information should not be treated as property concede that these 
concepts apply.  See, e.g., Samuelson, Information as Property, supra note 80, at 370.   
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selling a right of reference to a business partner.108  It could include sharing the 
protocols, case report forms, and tabulations with other business partners, 
subject to confidentiality arrangements, but declining to share any other 
materials.  A company might share the raw data and tabulations, but not the 
narratives, with an academic institution, so that institution could perform a 
meta-analysis with similar material provided by other companies.  Or the 
company could decline to do all of these things, submitting the material only to 
national regulatory authorities and always with the express request and 
understanding that the material would be treated as confidential.  In this case, 
it would profit, indefinitely, from its ownership of the contents.109 
Finally, one has the right to transfer or dispose of the property in question.  
A biopharmaceutical company that generates a clinical module may transfer, 
sell, or abandon its rights in the module in question.  For example, when one 
company acquires or merges with another, it may acquire the manufacturing 
facilities, the right to manufacture and market the drugs and biologics in 
question, the patent rights at issue, and ownership of (and access to) the relevant 
NDA and BLA files.110 
2.  A Closer Look at the Right to Exclude 
The right to exclude bears a closer look.  The scope of the right to exclude 
should derive from the universe of possible uses.  To be sure, as Professor 
Outterson points out, it is harder to exclude third parties from using knowledge 
than from using physical property.111  But when the content at issue here is fully 
described (i.e., as more than just knowledge) and its possible uses by others 
catalogued, it becomes evident that one can disclose this property, or even share 
it selectively, and preserve some of the right to exclude.  The paragraphs that 
 
108. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.3 (2013) (defining right of reference for purpose of NDAs). 
109. That ability to profit from ownership of the contents is subject to the fact that under the 
laws of every country, a second entrant’s drug can at some point be approved pursuant to a comparative 
application without comparable support.  The abbreviated application pathway is an important 
limitation on the right to exclude and involves indirect reliance on the company’s assets, which in 
principle the company should have the right to exclude.  See LOCKE, supra note 90, at § 34 (“He that 
had as good left for his improvement, as was already taken up, needed not complain, ought not to 
meddle with what was already improved by another’s labour: if he did, it is plain he desired the benefit 
of another’s pains, which he had no right to, and not the ground which God had given him in common 
with others to labor on, and whereof there was as good left, as that already possessed, and more than 
he knew what to do with, or his industry could reach to.”). 
110. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.72, 314.99(a) (governing change in ownership of an NDA); FOOD 
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, SOPP 8403: ISSUANCE AND REISSUANCE OF LICENSES FOR 
BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS (2010), http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceCompliance
RegulatoryInformation/ProceduresSOPPs/ucm073468.htm (governing change in ownership of a 
BLA). 
111. Outterson, supra note 29, at 199. 
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follow describe how the information can be used. 
A competitor could use the content directly in its own regulatory filings to 
support approval of its competing products.112  Professor Eisenberg has argued 
that the concern about second entrants using released data to obtain approvals 
of their own was effectively mooted by enactment of the Hatch-Waxman 
amendments which effectively permit reliance on that data after statutory 
exclusivities have expired.113  She agrees in a footnote that released data can be 
used in foreign jurisdictions, and I believe this risk should be highlighted in 
today’s global pharmaceutical economy.  But the real concern is that where the 
data is released and available, an abbreviated application may not be required 
by the regulator.114  A full application can be submitted.  This effects an end 
run around regulatory exclusivity, which prohibits only approval, or sometimes 
submission, of abbreviated applications.  And even if a full application is not 
accepted, a literature-based or hybrid application may be accepted, even in 
Europe or the United States.115  Literature-based applications are theoretically 
 
112. See, e.g., Webb v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 696 F.2d 101, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
(“If a manufacturer’s competitor could obtain all the data in the manufacturer’s NDA, it could utilize 
them in its own NDA without incurring the time, labor, risk, and expense involved in developing them 
independently.”). 
113. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 381 (2007). 
114. See, e.g., Second Declaration of Nancy B. Sager at ¶¶ 14–15, 17, Gov. Accountability 
Project v. HHS, No. 07-01702 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2009) ECF No.19.1 (“If FDA were to disclose the 
information that the agency has withheld as confidential commercial information, a competitor could 
use that in information to support its own new drug application (‘NDA’) without having to incur the 
time and expense involved in developing the information itself.”) (making this point long after 
enactment of Hatch-Waxman and focusing on full applications).  The same point can be made about 
biologics applications, and, if anything, the risk is greater because the statute is drafted so loosely.  
FDA interprets the PHSA requirement as only “data derived from nonclinical laboratory and clinical 
studies which demonstrate that the manufactured product meets prescribed requirements of safety, 
purity, and potency.”  21 C.F.R. § 601.2(a).  It does not require that the data be owned by the applicant 
or that the applicant have a right of reference to it.   
115. FDA approves literature-based drug applications under section 505(b)(2) of the FDCA.  
Also, EU regulatory authorities have a record of approving—during the data exclusivity term—
marketing authorization applications, including pioneer data obtained by the applicant under 
transparency laws.  For instance, in 2008, generic versions of clopidogrel were approved by the 
German authorities during the data exclusivity period and on the basis (in large part) of data in the 
public domain, including summary reviews obtained from the U.S. FDA under FOIA.  Update: The 
German Plavix Case: Loopholes in European Data Protection?, JONES DAY COMMENTARY (2008), 
available at http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/16a3768f-10a5-4f6d-9525-5efa157b154f/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/3ba3b1c0-57c1-4e57-b838-0629d789527a/Update%20German
%20Plavix.pdf; Duncan Curley & Marleen H.J. van den Horst, Patents and Regulatory Data 
Exclusivity for Medicinal Products, in OVERLAPPING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 119, 123–24 
(Neil Wilkof & Shamnad Basheer eds., 2012).  The European Commission later issued a statement 
opposing this practice, but the EMA retains flexibility with respect to so-called “mixed” applications 
(partially bibliographic and partially based on the applicant’s own data), and applications based 
substantially on information released to the public are legally possible.  Press Release, The Pharma 
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possible in countries like Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, and Japan.116  
Of particular concern, some of these countries issue Certificates of 
Pharmaceutical Products (CPPs), which can be used in other countries as the 
basis for marketing authorization, creating a domino effect.117  There is also a 
risk that disclosure in one country would be taken in other countries to 
terminate the exclusivity period.118  In some jurisdictions, it may also be 
possible to use this content to partially bolster approval of a product that is not 
even claimed to be the same or similar.  That is, a competitor might be able to 
justify a fairly small data package for a new use of an already approved 
 
Letter, European Commission, Health: Germany Receives Final Warning to Comply with EU Rules 
on Well Established Medicinal Use (May 5, 2010), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
IP-10-536_en.htm.   
116. This assertion reflects the views of regulatory lawyers in the jurisdictions in question, with 
whom the author has worked in the past, regarding what their regulators are likely to accept in practice.  
Literature-based applications are accepted in Australia for orphan drugs.  See AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, 
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND AGING, THERAPEUTIC GOODS ADMIN., LITERATURE-BASED SUBMISSIONS 
(2003), available at http://www.tga.gov.au/industry/pm-literature-based-submissions.htm.  Brazilian 
authorities may accept hybrid applications for subsequent entrant biologics pursuant to the individual 
development pathway described in Resolution RDC No. 55/2010.  Nonclinical, phase I, and phase II 
data may be deleted, and although full reports are technically required for phase III, data from another 
country might persuade the regulator to approve all indications on the basis of data with respect to only 
one indication.  ANVISA, Agency Collegiate Board Resolution-RDC No. 55 , 80–81 (December 16, 
2010), available at http://portal.anvisa.gov.br/wps/wcm/connect/935aed0048bd2755a7cdaf9a6e94f0
d0/Registro_Produtos_Biologicos_Hemoterapicos_10102011_WEB.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. Canadian 
authorities have significant discretion with respect to the contents of new drug submissions and could 
in theory rely (at least in part) on data that supported another company’s product in another jurisdiction. 
Chinese authorities have broad discretion when determining which data are required for the different 
types of drug and biologic applications as well as the weight given to different types of data.  Indian 
regulatory authorities have the discretion to waive the requirement that new drug applications contain 
clinical data if the data are available from other countries.  E.g., CDSCO, DRAFT GUIDANCE ON 
APPROVAL OF CLINICAL TRIALS & NEW DRUGS, at 27 (2011), available at http://www.cdsco.nic.in/
Guidance_for_New_Drug_Approval-23.07.2011.pdf. It is possible this would be applied in practice to 
include data relating to another company’s product.  In Japan, there is at least a question whether the 
contents of released clinical trial reports would be deemed in the “public domain” and allow approval 
of second entrants during the re-examination period that follows approval of new drugs.  See Yakujihō 
[Pharmaceutical Affairs Law], Law No. 145 of 1960, art. 14 (Japan) translated in PHARMACEUTICAL 
AFFAIRS LAW OF JAPAN (ENGLISH EDITION) 9 (Yakugyo Jiho Co. ed. 1962).   
117. For instance, Brazil issues CPPs, and parts of the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East, 
Africa, and Latin America accept CPPs. See generally WHO, Certification Scheme on the Quality of 
Pharmaceutical Products Moving in International Commerce, Working document QAS/10.374 (May 
2010), available at http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/quality_safety/regulation_legislation/
certification/en/.  Thus release of the clinical module in one country could lead to approval in Brazil 
and in turn to approval in countries that participate in the CPP scheme. 
118. For instance, Article 25A of the Australian Therapeutic Goods Act provides five years of 
exclusivity for information relating to certain active components of new therapeutic goods, provided 
that the information is “not available to the public.” Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) s 25 pt 3-2 div 
2 (Austl.).  If a clinical module is released to the general public by another regulator, Australian 
authorities could take the position that the same information—submitted to Australia—was no longer 
subject to data exclusivity in the country. 
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medicine, by showing the regulator a robust data package that supported the 
same use of a previously approved (but not identical) medicine in the same 
class. 
There is more at issue than just whether the raw data might be used to 
support marketing authorizations.  The clinical module also provides valuable 
competitive intelligence.  Well-run and efficient clinical development programs 
are essential to successful drug development and marketing approval, and the 
effective presentation of the resulting information is the key to timely 
marketing approval.  A competitor with access to the content that supported 
approval would know exactly how much, and what sort of, data were required 
to obtain a given regulatory objective—as well as how to design and run its 
clinical development program, how to analyze the results, and how to present 
and package its application.  To be more concrete, the clinical study protocols 
and rationales for study design decisions (as well as decisions which studies to 
conduct and which not to conduct) reflect the marketing authorization holder’s 
investment, expertise, and experience, and they could simply be copied by the 
competitor.  The clinical module could also provide advance warning of, and 
solutions to, design and execution challenges with the studies.  Information 
about how the marketing authorization holder documented and tracked clinical 
information, and the responsibilities it maintained in-house or assigned to 
vendors, is sensitive business strategy and can be copied or could inform 
differing approaches in order to gain a competitive advantage.  The company’s 
statistical methodologies, actual statistical analyses, and conclusions could be 
cribbed.  They may shed light on ways to address missing data or other 
complications in data interpretations.  Information about the marketing 
authorization holder’s meeting with regulators would tell the competitor what 
to expect and how to handle it.  The company’s characterizations of and 
conclusions concerning its data, which appear in the clinical study reports, 
contain and reflect scientific judgments and regulatory strategy, all validated 
by regulatory approval. 
The notion that this information is highly valuable to a company’s 
competition should not be controversial.119  Nor is it speculative.  Instead, it is 
well documented that biopharmaceutical companies are deeply interested in 
obtaining the information in the applications of their competitors.  As early as 
1976, lawyers at FDA complained to Congress “of being forced to fund 
 
119. Professor Lemmens suggests that the industry’s concerns about the competitive advantage 
of the confidential information have been overstated because much of the information is available 
anyway.  See Lemmens, supra note 29, at 81.  He focuses mainly on patent applications and 
competitive intelligence, but these sources of information rarely overlap in any meaningful way with 
the actual contents of clinical modules.  Id. 
LIETZAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/1/2014  1:25 PM 
70 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 18:1 
 
‘industrial espionage’ through the agency’s FOIA procedures.”120  As late as 
2013, the EMA disclosed that a substantial percentage of requests for clinical 
modules under the European Transparency Regulation were filed by private 
competitors rather than public interest groups.121  In nearly forty years, little has 
changed.  Not surprisingly, companies go to great lengths to ensure the 
continuing confidentiality of their safety and efficacy data and information. 
Of course, not all companies seek to keep this information confidential, or 
to keep it confidential permanently.  The value of the information and of its 
continued secrecy can change over time.  If a product is no longer a significant 
source of revenue for a company, the benefit of maintaining secrecy—to 
prevent others from piggybacking and marketing copycat products—may not 
be worth the cost.  Some companies may routinely disclose clinical study 
reports, perhaps considering the resulting public goodwill a benefit to their 
business, for reasons that are uniquely their own.  Others may have calculated 
that given their particular structure and business model, as well as international 
commercial strategy (sequencing of applications and approvals around the 
world as well as markets targeted), regulatory exclusivity or the patents in their 
portfolio—or both—are sufficient to maintain an acceptable profit margin even 
if competitors are able to piggy-back on their research.  Smaller companies 
might release information to stimulate capital investment.  And sometimes 
companies do not know that their data have been leaked or released, or do not 
know in advance—for instance in countries with leaky regulators or regulators 
that are not fully committed to procedural protections for trade secrets.  In any 
case, whatever their reasons, some companies release or acquiesce to the 
release of their safety and efficacy information.  The vast majority have 
historically gone to great lengths to keep this material secret. 
 
120. See Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Weinberger, 411 F. Supp. 576, 579 n.7 (D.D.C. 1976) (citing 
Hearings on Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1977 (FDA) Before the Subcomm. on Agric. & Related 
Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 94th Cong. 717–18 (1976) (discussion with Richard A. 
Merrill, Asst. Gen. Counsel, FDA)); Business Record Exemption of the Freedom of Information Act: 
Hearings before the Gov’t Info. & Individual Rights Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 
95th Cong. 69 (1977) (statement of Donald Kennedy, Comm’r, FDA) (“about 80 percent of the 
Freedom of Information requests we receive are from business entities, private attorneys, and FOI 
service companies who are requesting records on behalf of corporate clients”); see MILGRIM, supra 
note 36, at § 12.03 (“[I]t has long been apparent that information placed in the hands of the government 
is more apt to be sought for competitive use than any public purpose.”). 
121. Peter Doshi & Tom Jefferson, Research Letters: The First 2 Years of the European 
Medicines Agency’s Policy on Access to Documents: Secret No Longer, 173 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 
380, 381–82 (2013) (“David Mackay, BVetMed, MSc, PhD, MRCVS, of the European Medicines 
Agency, closely reviewed the manuscript for accuracy and provided many clarifications about the 
EMA’s policy.”).  This document suggests that roughly one-third of the requests were filed directly by 
competitors.  A substantial percentage of the requests filed by lawyers and consultants are likely filed 
on behalf of competitors.  Id. 
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Because this information plays both an instructive role and a regulatory 
role, it is possible to permit some use and prevent other use.  To give a concrete 
example, if the EMA released a company’s clinical data over its objection, other 
governments can still—and most probably will—preserve regulatory 
exclusivities (i.e., decline to accept or approve abbreviated applications for the 
period of time laid down in local law).  They could also refuse applications 
from competitors that include those data in support of their own products (full 
applications) and otherwise maintain trade secret status for the corresponding 
clinical module in their countries.122  The right to prevent competitors from 
using that research in regulatory filings, to support their own market access with 
their own products, is analytically distinct and can therefore be preserved.  
Understanding the content as property (rather than trade secret)—and 
understanding the right to exclude broadly—thus provides a solution to the 
problem of operating in a multinational regulatory state.  The property right 
need not evaporate upon disclosure.123 
A robust reading of the right to exclude, combined with a full view of the 
regulatory context for this content, helps to explain why this content should not 
be perceived as a true public good.  Conventional wisdom holds that non-
excludable and non-rival goods are “public goods.”124  More specifically, it 
must be technically difficult to prevent others from using the good free of 
charge, and the use of the good by one person must not detract from the ability 
of another to use it.  The discussion above shows, however, that it is legally and 
technically possible for a regulator to decline to permit use of publicly available 
information to support approval of a medicinal product.125  Safety and 
effectiveness information is, in that sense, excludable.  Moreover, a plausible 
argument can be made that they are not non-rival.  A second entrant’s use of 
 
122. See by way of analogy the decision of the D.D.C. in its Memorandum Opinion in ACLU 
v. Dep’t of State, 878 F. Supp.2d 215, 218 (D.D.C. 2012) (mem.) (allowing the Department of State 
to redact, citing exemption 1, information that had already been placed in the public domain by 
Wikileaks). 
123. Professor Stedman wrote in 1962 that “[i]t is, indeed, a strange form of ‘property’ that 
disappears when the information it embraces becomes public . . . .”  John C. Stedman, Trade Secrets, 
23 OHIO ST. L.J. 4, 21 (1962).  I do not agree with Professor Stedman that this means trade secrets are 
not property.  Professor Milgrim, citing this article, refers to trade secrets as an evaporating or 
disappearing property right.  MILGRIM, supra note 88, at 2-23 n.17.  While this may be true as to some 
trade secrets, at least with respect to the content at issue here, the fact that it is possible to prevent some 
uses even after disclosure means that the right has not disappeared. 
124. See generally Uwe E. Reinhardt, An Information Infrastructure For the Pharmaceutical 
Market, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS 107, 110 (2004). 
125. This is what happens under orphan drug exclusivity schemes.  During the orphan 
exclusivity term, any application for the same drug for the same use will be rejected, even if it relies 
on publicly available information. See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a)(2) (“[T]he Secretary may not approve 
another application under section 355 . . . or issue another license under section 262 of title 42 for such 
drug for such disease or condition . . . .”).   
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the information, for instance, to support its own competing product, directly 
diminishes the value of the information to the person that created it.  It is 
correct, however, that one person’s use of the module to support approval of 
his own product does not exhaust the module, and that an infinite number of 
subsequent entrants can use the module to support their products.  In this sense, 
multiple people can stand on the same spot at the same time.  A positivist would 
say that a grant of property rights can solve the public good problem,126 but a 
more robust understanding of the right to exclude—combined with the natural 
rights premise—may undermine the public good assumption in the first 
instance.127 
D.  Implications 
1.  Application of Takings Principles 
The conclusion that this content is property leads principally to the 
conclusion that the Fifth Amendment applies to government actions.  The 
Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence is muddled by distracting lines between 
per se and regulatory takings, distinctions between intellectual and real 
property, and debates over the merits of ad hoc balancing tests.  It is easy to get 
tied in knots over whether a government action fully takes a portion of property 
or partially takes the entire property, i.e., over what actually has been taken.  
Where the property right itself is prone to being misconstrued too narrowly, as 
happens with respect to the content at issue here, the muddle impedes analysis. 
A conventional approach would begin with Monsanto, which appears on 
point because it related to disclosure of data—characterized by the Court as 
trade secrets and, therefore, property—submitted to support regulatory 
approval.  This case leads to the correct conclusion that forcible disclosure 
constitutes a taking.  But Justice Blackmun’s reading of the right to exclude is 
too narrow for the content at issue here, and it leads to an incorrect conclusion 
that disclosure (and taking) precludes any further Fifth Amendment arguments 
about non-consensual use. 
At issue in Monsanto were statutory provisions that authorized the EPA to 
disclose health and safety data submitted in pesticide registration applications 
and to use them for the benefit of subsequent applicants.  Provisions dating to 
 
126. See, e.g., Samuelson, Information as Property, supra note 80, at 371. 
127. Some might respond that the excludability just described is a function of regulatory 
structures and not an intrinsic feature of the information.  See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual 
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1052 n.87 (2005) (making that point about 
information in general).  But the content in question here—case report forms, data that have been 
manipulated and tabulated for a regulatory purpose, clinical study report narratives written for a 
regulator—owes its existence to the regulatory structure; the two are not severable. 
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1972 allowed an applicant to designate some of the data as “trade secret or 
commercial or financial information.”  A separate provision prohibited the EPA 
from publicly disclosing any data that in its judgment contained, or related to, 
trade secret or commercial or financial information.  Following a series of court 
cases in the 1970s clarifying that the phrase “trade secrets” was as broad as the 
Restatement and applied to health, safety, and environmental data, Congress 
amended the statute in 1978 to permit disclosure of these data to qualified 
requestors notwithstanding the freestanding prohibition, which remained 
intact.128 
Justice Blackmun, for the majority, wrote that the term “property” in the 
Takings Clause has generally been used “to denote the group of rights inhering 
in the citizen’s relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and 
dispose of it.”129  The right to exclude, he noted, is “generally one of the most 
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as 
property.”130  With respect to a trade secret, “the right to exclude others is 
central to the very definition of the property interest.”131  Finally, “[o]nce the 
data that constitute a trade secret are disclosed to others, or others are allowed 
to use those data [the other aspect of FIFRA at issue in the case], the holder of 
the trade secret has lost his property interest in the data.”132  This led to a takings 
analysis. 
The problem lies in Justice Blackmun’s comment that disclosure of the data 
in question eviscerates the property interest.  This outcome may have been 
correct as to pesticide registration data, perhaps because qualified requestors 
did not include foreign or multinational companies, or because of concurrent 
amendments to the scheme that governed use in second entrant applications.  
But it is not correct with respect to the safety and effectiveness information in 
drug applications.  Although black letter trade secret law holds that widespread 
disclosure of a trade secret eliminates trade secret status, finding that disclosure 
eliminates property status—where the information has both regulatory and 
informational uses—is inconsistent with the full right to exclude and thus with 
the property status of the content in the first instance.  Understanding this 
content as trade secret before understanding the content as property—as Justice 
Blackmun did—leads to absurd results.133 
 
128. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 993. 
129. Id. at 1003 (quoting General Motors, 323 U.S. at 377–78). 
130. Id. at 128. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Professor Bone, for instance, writes that “once someone learns information, there is no 
way to erase that knowledge and therefore no means of excluding the person in fact.”  Bone, supra 
note 57, at 254.  Accordingly, he concludes, “exclusivity must have seemed oddly inappropriate.”  Id.  
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Instead, Loretto provides a helpful launching point for beginning to think 
through the taking.134  This case concerned a New York law requiring landlords 
to permit cable companies to install cable facilities on their property.  The cable 
equipment in question used up a portion of Loretto’s apartment building roof 
and the side of her building.  Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, found a 
permanent physical occupation of Loretto’s property—not an easement—and 
concluded that this occupation “is a taking without regard to the public interests 
that it may serve.”135  Justice Marshall purported to apply the Penn Central 
balancing test,136 but “when the physical intrusion reaches the extreme form of 
a permanent physical occupation,” he wrote, the “character of the government 
action” becomes dispositive.137  (In Monsanto, the interference with reasonable 
investment-backed expectations became dispositive.)  In one sense, full 
disclosure of a clinical module—to the general public without attendant 
constraints on the uses to which the data can be put—is analogous, because it 
represents permanent and irrevocable destruction of the right to exclude.  
Unlike Penn Central, but like Loretto, this is not a situation where the property 
owner’s use of its own property is regulated.  The information may still be used, 
but it must be shared.138 
The Court in Loretto noted, however, that government occupation of land 
destroys all rights in the bundle as to the portion of land occupied, i.e., “chops 
through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand.”139  These concepts do not 
apply comfortably to forcible information sharing, for the same reason that 
 
And for this reason, “secrecy was the sine qua non of possession and thus of common law property 
rights in information.” Id. at 255.  This may be true outside the regulatory context.  But where the 
content is created in order to overcome a multi-national barrier to market entry, secrecy is only part of 
possession.  Professor Stroud proposes a “hybrid property/relationship” theory of trade secrets that 
would permit prospective exclusion where parties obtain a trade secret innocently through publication 
(e.g., via the internet), so that the innovator can recoup its investment.  See generally Stroud, supra 
note 72.  He argues mainly from the need to protect substantial investments and from modern 
developments like the internet.  Id. The conclusion seems right from a public policy perspective, and 
the proposed approach to trade secrets is intriguing, although this article takes a different analytical 
approach. 
134. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
135. Id. at 426. 
136. Penn Central involved the government imposing a restriction on the property owner’s use 
of his own property, which is not the case here.  See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 
104 (1978); see also Epstein, supra note 85, at 63.  Here the Court identified three factors to be 
considered when assessing whether a government action is a taking: (1) whether the government action 
“interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,” (2) the economic impact of the 
government’s action on the property owner, and (3) the nature of the government action.  Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. 438 U.S. at 124. 
137. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. 438 U.S. at 123. 
138. Cf. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 430 (distinguishing between “a permanent physical occupation, a 
physical invasion short of an occupation, and a regulation that merely restricts the use of property”).   
139. Id. at 435. 
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some think information is a public good.  Two can use the clinical module at 
the same time.  For this reason, Kaiser Aetna may be the most relevant 
precedent.140  This case involved a marina that had been created by Kaiser 
Aetna, at considerable expense, by dredging and filling Kuapa Pond and 
connecting the pond to Maunalua Bay and through that bay to the ocean.  The 
federal government concluded that this action made the pond-now-marina 
subject to the “navigational servitude” of the federal government and that the 
general public now held a right of access.  Justice Rehnquist agreed that the 
dredged pond constituted “navigable waters” and that the Commerce Clause 
permitted Congress to assure the public a free right of access as a result.  But, 
he noted, the takings question was separate.141  The Court did not apply the ad 
hoc inquiry derived from Penn Central and used in Monsanto.142  Because the 
government’s action resulted in loss of “one of the most essential sticks in the 
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property”—the right to 
exclude—the government’s action amounted to a taking under the diminution-
of-value reasoning of Justice Holmes’s opinion in the coal mining case, 
Pennsylvania Co. v. Mahon.143 
In Mahon, Justice Holmes observed that when “[diminution of value] 
reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise 
of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.”144  The case involved 
mining for coal underneath the land to which Mahon owned only surface rights, 
with the Pennsylvania Coal Company owning rights to remove all coal below 
the surface.  A statute passed subsequent to the sale of surface rights to Mahon 
forbade mining that would cause subsidence of structures used for human 
habitation.  The issue before the Court was the statute’s destruction of the 
company’s property rights.  Justice Holmes pointed out that “the right to coal 
consists in the right to mine it” and that making it “commercially impracticable 
to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes 
as appropriating or destroying it.”145  Further, “while property may be regulated 
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”146  
This gave rise to “regulatory takings” doctrine.  The statute in Mahon 
eviscerated the property owner’s ability to make profitable use of its property.  
 
140. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
141. Id. at 172. 
142. If one were inclined simply to apply the Penn Central factors, one could reason from either 
Monsanto (interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations) or Kaiser Aetna (nature of 
the government action, analogous to a physical invasion), either of which would be dispositive here. 
143. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).   
144. Id. at 413.   
145. Id. at 414.   
146. Id. at 415. 
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Disclosure of drug application contents, when combined with an environment 
that permits, or fails to prevent, use (including use by regulators), would 
perhaps be analogous.  Disclosure in an environment that safeguards against 
some use, however, might not be analogous.  But the “diminution in value” 
concept should still lead to the conclusion that a compensable taking had 
occurred. 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council relies on Mahon to articulate a 
similar principle.147  Lucas bought residential lots in 1986 on which he intended 
to build single-family homes.  The South Carolina legislature in 1988 enacted 
a statute that had the direct effect of barring him from erecting habitable 
structures on those parcels.  Justice Scalia concluded that a regulation 
eliminating all economically beneficial use of real property requires 
compensation, unless the regulation makes explicit restrictions that were 
inherent in the title itself.  Indeed, he noted, quoting Sir Edward Coke, “what is 
the land but the profits thereof?”148  While the disclosure of a company’s 
clinical modules to its competitors does not prevent that company from 
obtaining approval of its product or using the information in future research, it 
does effectively remove its ability to license that content to third parties (i.e., 
eliminates a revenue stream) and substantially reduces, possibly eliminates 
entirely, the profit it could have realized from the module in the first instance 
(i.e., by creating competition at a fraction of the price). 
As the Court wrote in 1960, the primary purpose of the Takings Clause is 
“to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”149  
It seems axiomatic that if the public has a broader interest in the fruits of the 
labor of the pharmaceutical industry, the public should bear the burden of 
paying for the fruits in question (or generate its own).  At the same time, a 
robust understanding of the right to exclude with respect to property that has 
multiple functions—regulatory as well as informational—shows that disclosure 
is not the same thing as use.  And this in turn leads to a conclusion that the 
scope of the taking, and perhaps compensation, will vary with the nature of the 
disclosure and with other aspects of the law.  Disclosure to parties that may not 
make competitive use of the information, for instance, or disclosure combined 
with explicit rules precluding use in marketing applications and in the 
regulatory process is meaningfully different from a Fifth Amendment 
perspective from disclosure to all, or disclosure combined with silence about 
subsequent use, ambiguous rules on use, or rules expressly permitting use.  And 
 
147. 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992). 
148. See id. at 1017 (quoting 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES, ch. 1, § 1 (1st Amend. Ed., 1812)). 
149. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
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this leads to the public policy question. 
2.  Public Policy Should Shape the Taking and Ancillary Legal Reform 
The most compelling argument for disclosure of the contents of clinical 
modules in marketing applications is that the information might be used by 
others in ways that would benefit the public health and that the owners 
themselves either will not do so (lacking the incentive) or cannot do so (because 
they lack the necessary information, e.g., for a meta-analyses of data from 
multiple products).  This leads to two public policy solutions: (a) incentives for 
sponsors to perform research of this sort, individually or collectively, and (b) 
limited release by regulators (i.e., of the information necessary, such as 
protocols, case report forms, and statistical analyses) to third parties (e.g., 
nonprofit researchers) for the purposes in question (e.g., aggregation and meta-
analysis), subject to just compensation. 
The second solution, limited release to appropriate third parties with just 
compensation, only partly responds to the “right to health” argument for 
disclosure advanced by Professor Lemmens.  Professor Lemmens argues for 
free flow of this information among a larger array of stakeholders, including 
private scientists (presumably competitors), patients, and prescribers, as a way 
to promote evidence-based decision-making in healthcare.150  Making the 
information available to private industry scientists is, however, not essential to 
ensure a meaningful contribution to evidence-based medicine, and it collides 
squarely with the most compelling argument against disclosure of the 
information in question—the fact that competitors may use this information to 
free-ride on the work of the first entrant.  Making the information available to 
patients and prescribers could also undermine the quality of dialogue between 
physician and patient.  Releasing all of the safety and effectiveness data and 
information in approved applications, including the broader file as 
supplemented over time, will prompt third parties—some with good intentions, 
others with nefarious intentions—to collect, interpret, analyze, manipulate, and 
republish the information and their own conclusions and recommendations.  As 
it stands now, a patient researching her symptoms or a medication that her 
doctor has recommended is faced with a dizzying array of information sources, 
many legitimate, but some not.  These will proliferate, if the contents of 
marketing applications become available. 
Indeed, broader disclosure could have a deleterious effect on the role of 
FDA in our public health system.  Professor Laakmann suggests that non-
disclosure undermines faith in the industry, approved medicines, regulators, 
 
150. See Lemmens, supra note 29, at 89–91. 
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and the regulatory process.151  But at least in the United States, with its culture 
of free speech, junk science, and patient empowerment through the internet, an 
unfiltered information dump is more likely to have the opposite effect.  FDA 
derives a great deal of its perceived legitimacy and thus effectiveness from 
playing a pivotal—and frequently premarket—role with respect to the safety, 
and often effectiveness, of nearly twenty-five percent of the consumer 
economy.152  Releasing the information wholesale will prompt third parties to 
generate their own recommendations on the safe and effective use of approved 
medications and their own views on safety issues—in essence, parallel systems 
of warnings, precautions, and contraindications.  The impact of parallel 
systems—one official, others highly credible but differing, and others less 
credible and careful but perhaps more accessible or compelling to lay persons—
on physician and patient behavior, and the public health, should be explored.153  
We have a profound interest in a strong centralized regulator with the ability to 
make definitive judgments on safety, efficacy, and labeling of medicines and 
the authority to enforce those judgments.  A world of semi-persuasive wiki-
labeling would not serve the public interest.154 
Nor would an official process of peer-reviewing FDA decisions further the 
primary public policy goal identified by Professor Laakmann, that of restoring 
confidence in the regulatory scheme.  Post-hoc peer review of approval and 
labeling decisions runs the same risk of suggesting the regulator’s conclusions 
are not, in fact, definitive or reliable.  Moreover, when FDA decides that a 
product is safe and effective, meaning that its benefits outweigh its risks when 
used as the manufacturer proposes to label it, the agency is also making a policy 
decision based in part on our collective level of risk tolerance.  The agency is 
accountable for its decisions through its Senate-confirmed executive as well as 
 
151. Laakmann, supra note 4, at 326–27. 
152. See FDA, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: STRATEGIC PLAN FOR REGULATORY SCIENCE (Jan. 16, 
2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RegulatoryScience/ucm2680
95.htm (“In the U.S., FDA-regulated products account for about 25 cents of every dollar spent by 
American consumers each year—products that touch the lives of every American every day.”). 
153. Further, if FDA’s role and authority with respect to safety and effectiveness of medicines 
are undermined, its effectiveness with respect to other public health functions (e.g., product recalls and 
food safety) could also be undermined.   
154. Moreover, federal agency approval and labeling decisions affect what can and cannot be 
said about the products (and by whom), what will and will not be paid for (and by whom), and what 
does and does not give rise to product liability.  If these decisions are stripped of their certainty and 
viewed by stakeholders (such as physicians, patients, medical licensure and standards organizations, 
pharmacists and pharmacy boards, insurers, plaintiff lawyers, and prosecutors) instead as opinions, 
these other bodies of law will be affected.  Thus, as Professor Cahoy suggests, the impact of disclosure 
on products liability theory must be examined.  See Cahoy, supra note 29.  To the extent that claims 
are currently predicated on failure to alert physicians in the approved labeling of a particular safety 
risk that was hidden in the confidential file, after disclosure one might easily argue those claims must 
simply fail.   
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through Congressional oversight.  And the agency’s decisions are driven by 
precedent, policy, and consideration of collateral consequences. No academic 
or non-profit organization performing peer review is similarly positioned to 
consider precedent, public policy, and collateral consequences, nor is any 
similarly accountable. 
In any case, there is already a considerable amount of truthful and accurate 
information in the public domain for physicians and patients about the clinical 
trials performed on approved medicines.  This includes the approved 
labeling.155  It also includes the action package on the FDA website, which 
includes detailed memoranda prepared by agency scientists who reviewed the 
trials.156  And it includes the clinical study results database maintained by the 
National Institutes of Health at www.clinicaltrials.gov.157  Biopharmaceutical 
 
155. This labeling contains two sections describing the clinical research performed to support 
approval.  Section 12 describes clinical pharmacology studies, and section 14 describes the remaining 
clinical studies. FDA regulations require the latter to discuss the studies that “facilitate an 
understanding of how to use the drug safely and effectively.”  The description includes a “discussion 
of study design, population, endpoints, and results.”  Also, if a specific study is mentioned anywhere 
in the labeling because it is essential to understanding the information in that section, that study must 
be discussed in section 14.  Section 6 of the package insert describes “the overall adverse reaction 
profile of the drug based on the entire safety database.”  Where adverse reactions have significant 
clinical implications, the labeling includes details about “the nature, frequency, and severity of the 
adverse reaction and the relationship of the adverse reaction to drug dose and demographic 
characteristics, if those data are available and important.”  21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(7), (13), (15) (2013).  
156. The action package includes documents generated by FDA related to review of the 
application; documents pertaining to the format and content of the application generated during drug 
development; labeling submitted by the applicant; a summary review that documents conclusions from 
all reviewing disciplines about the drug; and the Division Director and Office Director’s decision 
document.  21 U.S.C. § 355(l) (2006).  The materials generally include medical reviews, chemistry 
reviews, pharmacology reviews, statistical reviews, and clinical pharmacology and biopharmaceutics 
reviews.  These documents describe the application in detail and explain the reviewing scientist’s views 
and conclusions.  Many action packages include administrative documents and correspondence, 
including memoranda from teleconferences, meeting minutes, letters responding to requests for 
information from FDA, and other internal memoranda relating to FDA’s review of the application.  
The agency applies exemption 4 of FOIA before posting the material.  
157.  42 U.S.C. § 282(j)(2) (2006).  This scheme applies to any controlled clinical investigation, 
other than a phase 1 investigation, of a new drug.  Among other things, the responsible party provides, 
and NIH posts: (1) a table of the demographic and baseline characteristics of the patient sample, overall 
and for each arm of the trial, including the number of patients who dropped out and the number of 
patients excluded from the analysis; (2) primary and secondary outcome measures (as submitted to the 
registry), and a table of values for each primary and secondary outcome measure for each arm of the 
trial, including the results of scientifically appropriate tests of the statistical significance of the outcome 
measures; (3) a table of anticipated and unanticipated serious adverse events grouped by organ system, 
with number and frequency in each arm of the trial; and (4) a table of anticipated and unanticipated 
adverse events not included in the serious adverse events table and that exceed a frequency of 5 percent 
within any arm of the clinical trial, grouped by organ system, with number and frequency in each arm 
of the trial.  Enforcement is tied to federal funding and to acceptance and approval of regulatory 
submissions.  A further expansion through rulemaking, though authorized by statute, has not yet 
happened.  Id. at § 282.  Eventually, the database will include summaries of the trial, and its results, 
LIETZAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/1/2014  1:25 PM 
80 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 18:1 
 
companies and the external investigators they employ to conduct clinical trials 
also discuss their research at scientific conferences and in scientific journals.  
The major safety and efficacy trials relating to new medicines are almost always 
presented at professional conferences and often published in peer-reviewed 
medical journals. 
Other policy arguments for broad disclosure of the contents of clinical 
modules overlook less drastic means to accomplish their objectives.  There is, 
for instance, an argument that readily accessible information about study results 
is inherently biased—because biopharmaceutical manufacturers decline to 
release or publish the results of negative trials, or because the medical journals 
prefer to publish positive trials.158  The result, it is said, is that prescribers and 
patients lack complete and unbiased information on which to make their 
decisions.159  The question, however, is whether public release of the full data 
and analysis for every trial for every approved drug is an effective way to solve 
this issue, assuming the assertion is substantiated.  A requirement to register 
every trial and to post summaries of the results, understandable to healthcare 
professionals and understandable to lay persons, would seem to solve most of 
the problem.  Federal law already imposes this requirement,160 and if the 
summaries are not sufficiently robust to elucidate the negative aspects of the 
trial results, the solution is to revise the requirements for the format, content, 
and scope of the summaries.  A requirement to report to the national regulatory 
authority the result of every trial relevant to safety and effectiveness of the drug, 
a requirement that product labeling not be misleading by virtue of omission of 
material facts, and regulatory authority to mandate safety-related labeling 
changes when warranted would seem to solve the rest of the problem.  Again, 
federal law already embraces these concepts.161  If there is a substantiated 
concern that these requirements are flouted, or the regulator weak, the solution 
 
for both patients and healthcare professionals (if the Secretary determines that they can be included 
without being misleading or promotional) and either the full protocol, or the information about the 
protocol to help to evaluate the trial results; and perhaps other appropriate information. 
158. E.g., Lemmens, supra note 29, at 92–93 (citing studies that “indicate that industry-
sponsored trials are much more likely than other trials to conclude that drugs produced by the 
sponsoring company are safe and effective”); Joanna K. Sax, Protecting Scientific Integrity: The 
Commercial Speech Doctrine Applied to Industry Publications, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 206–07 
(2011) (arguing that industry manipulates the public through the publication of misleading studies and 
citing reports that company-sponsored research is more likely than non-profit research to report 
favorable results). 
159. See also Eisenberg, supra note 113, at 382 (“Publicly available data would permit patients, 
doctors, and insurers to make better choices of drugs.”). 
160. See supra note 157. 
161. 42 U.S.C. § 282(j)(3), (4)(C) (relating to reporting clinical trial results), 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) 
(relating to misleading labeling or advertising), 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (relating to false or misleading 
labeling), 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4) (relating to safety labeling changes).  
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lies in strengthening its authority and enforcement capabilities—not in 
implicitly undermining it with a parallel structure of medicine review. 
If broad disclosure were instead required, public policy considerations 
might compel parallel reform to other bodies of law.  For instance, 
biopharmaceutical manufacturers are subject to strict rules regarding what they 
can and cannot say about their approved medications.  FDA’s regulatory regime 
generally prohibits speech about approved prescription drugs outside the drug’s 
approved package insert, unless specifically exempted by the agency from its 
requirements governing labeling, even if the speech is truthful, informative, and 
fully consistent with the approved uses of the drug.  To give a concrete 
example: the agency routinely objects to companies providing information to 
physicians about subgroup analyses that do not appear in the approved 
physician labeling—such as information that the drug may work particularly 
well in specific groups and not in others.162  To give another example, where a 
company scientist speaks publicly about the company’s approved drugs and 
receives a question from the audience that calls for a response that is outside 
the labeling, current agency guidance indicates the speaker must respond 
privately and outside the public forum.163  If, however, the safety and 
effectiveness data and information have been released publicly, it seems unfair, 
arguably inconsistent with the premise for disclosure, and possibly contrary to 
the public health, to preclude the entity that generated the data, information, 
and analysis in question from engaging freely in the ensuing discussion. 
Takings considerations inherently counsel for limited disclosure.  Public 
policy considerations similarly counsel for limited disclosure: to non-profit 
scientific and academic researchers and institutions, for general medical 
research that will benefit the public health—aggregation and meta-analyses of 
work performed on a particular molecule by different companies, for instance, 
or research to detect issues of safety and efficacy related to an entire class.  Peer 
review of approval and labeling decisions risks undermining the central role of 
 
162. See, e.g., Letter from Marybeth Toscano, PharmD, Regulatory Review Officer, Division 
of Professional Drug Promotion, Office of Prescription Drug Promotion, et al. to Alexandra Burtoft, 
Associate Program Director, Commercial Regulatory Affairs, Genentech, Inc., (Oct. 3, 2012), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/
EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceutical
Companies/UCM323628.pdf; Letter from Thomas W. Abrams, RPh, MBA, Director, Division of Drug 
Marketing, Advertising, and Communications to Three Rivers Pharmaceuticals, LLC (Mar. 21, 2011), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Enforcement
ActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/ucm2592
49.htm. 
163. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY RESPONDING TO UNSOLICITED REQUESTS FOR OFF-
LABEL INFORMATION ABOUT PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND MEDICAL DEVICES: DRAFT GUIDANCE, at 
10–12 (2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory
Information/Guidances/UCM285145.pdf.  
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the regulator, and broader dissemination risks flooding physicians and patients 
with alternative and non-credible analysis.  Only the information necessary to 
perform this research should be shared, which would protect a fair amount of 
the narrative in clinical study reports.  And the information should be shared 
with enforceable confidentiality restrictions in place, with some care given to 
ensure that the resulting conclusions and research can be published for 
stakeholders.  The other arguments for disclosure, and an approach of broader 
(public) disclosure, seem insufficient to outweigh concerns about undermining 
incentives to innovate.  At the very least, if broad disclosure to the public is 
implemented, manufacturers should be allowed to engage freely in discussion 
about their products, and liability arguments that they have failed to disclose 
safety information to patients should fail. 
3.  Just Compensation Follows 
Limiting the taking to this disclosure and expressly precluding use by 
competitors may reduce the compensation owed.164  Whether the disclosure is 
broad or narrow, the U.S. government can limit the content’s use by 
competitors, by confirming that it will not rely on the released information to 
support applications, nor use it to guide or advise applicants.  It can honor rights 
to reference and otherwise confirm that it views the contents of the applications 
as private property with at least some strands of the property bundle intact.  
Controlled disclosure with confidentiality agreements in place, regardless of 
these ancillary non-use protections, might not even eliminate trade secret status 
for purposes of conventional trade secret law.165  But it is clearly government 
action stripping the property owner of some rights, and thus just compensation 
is required. 
Just compensation for the taking can be achieved through any of various 
mechanisms, including establishment of panels to calculate the recovery, as 
was done for the data in pesticide applications.166  Certain fundamental 
 
164. Fla. Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Logically, the 
amount of just compensation should be proportional to the value of the interest taken as compared to 
the total value of the property . . . .”).  But see Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1011–12 (“With respect to a 
trade secret, the right to exclude others is central to the very definition of the property interest. Once 
the data that constitute a trade secret are disclosed to others, or others are allowed to use those data, 
the holder of the trade secret has lost his property interest in the data. That the data retain usefulness 
for Monsanto even after they are disclosed . . . is irrelevant to the determination of the economic impact 
of the EPA action on Monsanto’s property right. The economic value of that property right lies in the 
competitive advantage over others that Monsanto enjoys by virtue of its exclusive access to the data, 
and disclosure or use by others of the data would destroy that competitive edge.”) (internal footnotes 
omitted). 
165. See CHISUM, supra note 82, at 200 n.5 (“Today, secrecy must only be ‘relative,’ or the 
subject of efforts that are ‘reasonable under the circumstances.’”) (citation omitted). 
166. See Amendment to the Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, § 2(a)(1), 92 
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principles guide just compensation determinations, though these principles may 
be tricky to apply in this setting.  Just compensation seeks to compensate for 
the owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain.167  The owner’s loss is usually interpreted 
as the fair market value of the property, meaning what a willing seller and a 
willing buyer would agree to on an open market.168  But this property and this 
taking have characteristics that present special challenges for the application of 
these principles.  First, this property is by its nature confidential, and there is 
no open market or comparable piece of property to use as a reference for 
determining its fair market value.  Second, one would have to determine the 
portion of the total value taken by the confidential disclosure to academic 
researchers for purposes of general research.  If the willing seller would release 
this content to these entities for this purpose for a fairly minimal payment, then 
that is just compensation.  But that must be determined as to each property 
owner.  An alternative to compensation panels would be some sort of statutory 
quid pro quo, such as patent term restoration or special exclusivity.  If in fact 
the value taken varies, however, a procrustean bed will not satisfy the Fifth 
Amendment.  The statutory quid pro quo will need to be flexible, or Fifth 
Amendment considerations will require that companies have the option to seek 
monetary compensation instead.  Further, due process considerations may 
dictate that a quid pro quo not be forced onto companies that have already 
generated and submitted this content. 
4.  The International Dimension 
Disclosure in a multi-national environment could moot the just 
compensation question.  A foreign regulator may take the first step, whether 
releasing all of the content to the general public or releasing some of the content 
to a smaller contingent.  But the Takings Clause is grounded in the principle 
that the government is not free to commandeer private property for public 
 
Stat. 819, 820–22.  The 1978 amendments to FIFRA removed responsibility for arbitrating disputes 
over data compensation from EPA and delegated it instead to an arbitration service, whose decisions 
would not be reviewable by any court except for fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct. 
167. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 228 (1956); United States v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949) 
(citing McGovern v. New York, 229 U.S. 363 (1913)); United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 
U.S. 266 (1943)); see also 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.01[5] (J. Sackman ed., 3d ed. 2009); 
David G. Oberdick, Comment, The Taking of Trade Secrets: What Constitutes Just Compensation?, 
48 U. PITT. L. REV. 247, 247–48 (1986). 
168. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377 (1946); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. 
United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 394, 407–08 (1989), corrected, 20 Cl. Ct. 324 (1990), aff’d, 926 F.2d 1169 
(Fed. Cir. 1991); Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for 
Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 678, 682 (2005); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for 
Takings: How Much is Just?, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 721, 725 (1993); NICHOLS, supra note 167, at 
§ 12.01. 
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purposes without paying just compensation.  Where the same property resides 
simultaneously in the hands of multiple governments, any of which could take 
the property and effect a taking in all jurisdictions at the same time and for the 
benefit of all jurisdictions, the principles behind the Fifth Amendment should 
not permit the U.S. government to eschew cabining the impact on U.S. property 
rights.  Even where release is broad (e.g., outright disclosure in Europe over the 
objection of the property owner), U.S. property law can accommodate 
preservation of other sticks in the bundle, and the moral imperative of the Fifth 
Amendment requires that it do so.  FDA should decline to use the released data 
for the benefit of second entrants.  This is the final reason the trade secret label 
leads to an absurd result.  The suggestion that forced disclosure terminates all 
property status—all sticks in the bundle of rights—makes no sense doctrinally 
(unless one does not believe the content is property in the first instance), and it 
is untenable from a policy perspective in a multi-jurisdictional regulatory 
environment.169 
An alternative policy approach would be for the United States to implement 
incentives for the industry to share the information with nonprofit researchers.  
As noted earlier, industry has announced a voluntary cabined data-sharing 
program.170  Implicit in this volunteerism, however, is the specter of broader 
disclosure by a foreign regulator against whom takings claims are not tenable.  
But the law has two ways to achieve socially beneficial use of privately owned 
property where that socially beneficial use presents a negative risk/benefit 
balance to the property’s owner and will not be voluntarily undertaken: the law 
of eminent domain, on the one hand, and the offering of an incentive that shifts 
the property owner’s risk/benefit balance, on the other hand.  In the real 
property context, the states and federal government offer a variety of incentives 
to encourage the best and most socially beneficial use of land.  The statutory 
quid pro quos mentioned earlier, patent term restoration and market exclusivity, 
could be considered by the U.S. government as incentives to engage in this 
volunteerism, or they could be offered in the spirit of compensation where the 
EMA has moved first.  The elegance of a truly voluntary approach with 
incentives in place is that the resulting property reallocation would inherently 
take into account the multinational impact of the disclosure. 
 
169. As noted, however, one could also reach this result under trade secret law, because the 
secrecy required is only that which is reasonable under the circumstances. Arguably testing data remain 
sufficiently secret for misappropriation concepts to apply in the United States, where there has been 
disclosure abroad limited to a specific class of entities (academics) for a specific purpose (additional 
research). 
170. See supra note 28. 
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CONCLUSION 
The public interest will be advanced by ensuring that the data and scientific 
analyses supporting the conclusions that medicines are safe and effective are 
shared on a confidential basis with nonprofit researchers for generalized 
research in the public interest.  Broader approaches (more information, more 
recipients) present serious risks that are not justified by any increased public 
health benefit.  Public release would give competitors information to support 
their products and guide their research and development strategies—
government-sanctioned “free-riding” that would imperil the privately-funded 
research and development model.  Peer review of individual approval and 
labeling decisions may collide with our interest in a robust, respected, and final 
decisions by a central medicines authority. 
At the same time, the content is property.  No matter how narrowly tailored 
the disclosure or how robust or effective the confidentiality restrictions, 
releasing this content constitutes a taking under U.S. law that requires just 
compensation.  But particularly when cabined in this fashion, it need not be 
understood as inherently obliterating all property rights in the data.  Ancillary 
legal reforms (prevention of regulator use) will further limit the taking and 
arguably the required compensation.  In short, where it is possible for regulators 
to disentangle disclosure from use and to disentangle indirect use from direct 
use, the narrowest taking that achieves the public health goal should be effected.  
To the extent that a compensable taking has occurred in the United States, 
policymakers can consider statutory in kind compensation.  If the disclosure 
has been effected by a foreign regulator, policymakers can and should blunt the 
impact in the United States by preserving the other strands in the property right 
in the United States.  As a policy matter, they can and should also consider 
offering the same in kind compensation, to ensure that the impact on property 
rights does not affect incentives to innovate. 
